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Transformative Feminist Approach to Tort Law: 




Two years ago I was invited to speak at a faculty workshop in a 
prestigious university in Israel.  Preparing for my lecture, titled “Women 
Victims of Sexual Violence Reclaiming Power Under Tort Law,” I wondered 
whether I ought to commence the presentation by introducing the ostensibly 
clear need for feminist analysis of tort law.  I decided to do so in order to 
provide background to the theoretical framework of the presentation.  
However, I realized five minutes into my address that, what I thought was a 
clear critical perspective of the gender bias embedded in tort law, was 
unclear to my audience of legal scholars.  My presentation also awakened a 
sense of discomfort that required explanation, demonstration and 
justification of my perspective.  To further this apparent need, the entire 
remainder of my lecture focused instead on what was meant to be an 
introductory note.  This experience made me realize, as many other feminists 
probably do, that it will take a long while before scholars completely accept 
the contribution of feminist analysis to the development of tort law.  Indeed, 
although this approach achieved dominance in the critical analysis of law as 
a whole, and in Israeli law in particular, it still has not attained the same 
recognition and legitimacy that other critical approaches enjoy, such as the 
realist approach or the economic analysis of law. 
This anecdote exemplifies the need to dwell longer on the primary 
importance of legal critical analysis from a feminist perspective.  
Nevertheless, I chose in this article to refrain from re-challenging the basic 
premise that feminist analysis is indeed relevant to legal analysis.  My article 
therefore adheres to the view that there is no need to repeatedly prove what 
is already obvious: that feminist analysis is as relevant to tort law—
 
*  Associate Professor, The College of Management Striks Law School, Israel and 
Affiliated Visiting Professor, Peking University School of Transnational Law, China.  Ph.D., 
The Hebrew University (2005); Visiting Researcher, Harvard University Law School (2004-
2005); LL.M., Yale Law School (2009).  I wish to thank the College of Management research 
fund for its generous support.  This paper is written from my scholarly perspective as a tort 
law researcher, as well as from my practical perspective as the manager of Tmura Center, 
where I provide pro bono representation to female victims of sexual violence in strategic 
litigation of their tort claims in Israeli courts. 
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jurisprudence and reasoning—as it is to any other field of law.1  Instead, I 
intend to discuss here the significant role feminist approach plays in 
developing and expanding tort law, as well as the richer understanding 
feminist approach has effected in this legal field.  I use Israeli case law to 
exemplify this transformative influence.  If I were to borrow a metaphor from 
the feminist conceptual dictionary, I would say that establishing and 
justifying the importance of feminist analysis in tort law is part of the “first 
wave” of feminist critique, while exploring the continuous contribution it has 
made to the development of that law can accordingly be considered the 
“second wave.”2  This article takes this second wave, created by the ripple 
effect of the first wave, as an opportunity for forging a theoretical standpoint 
to critically scrutinize the development of the first wave and recognize its 
effects.  I argue that exploring this stage is crucial to determining the 
potential of feminist analysis for fostering improved access to justice for 
women, both by forging new tort doctrines and using the existing ones in a 
better, more nuanced manner.  
Though this article focuses predominantly on the way in which feminist 
analysis influenced Israeli tort law, the domestic nature of feminist analysis 
carries within it a two-fold larger interest.  Firstly, it demonstrates the cross-
border influence of American scholars of tort law in the first wave of feminist 
analysis, indicating its transnational prominence as a primary tool of legal 
analysis.  Secondly, based on its inception as well as development within 
common law tradition, Israeli tort law analysis can serve as a site for 
comparison and inspiration for other common law legal systems undergoing 
feminist critique.3  More peculiarly to Israel, the rapid acceleration in the 
development of tort law during the past two decades has served as a 
comfortable cushion for the implementation of feminist theory and, 
accordingly, the expansion of its influence. 
My article proceeds as follows: Chapter One consists of a short 
introduction where I present the structural difficulty feminist analysis 
encounters when applied to tort law.  Chapter Two lays out an overview of 
the principal critique first wave feminist analysis offers on common law tort 
law.  During this stage, I will argue that the main function of feminist 
analysis was to expose the gender biases inherent in tort law, and point out 
that tort law’s supposed “neutral” and traditional application better served 
men’s needs and interests than women’s.  Chapter Three introduces the 
 
 1. Readers who are new to this field and are interested in learning more about the nature 
of feminist legal analysis are hereby referred TO HILAIRE BARNETT, INTRODUCTION TO 
FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE (1998); D. KELLY WEISBERG, APPLICATIONS OF FEMINIST LEGAL 
THEORY TO WOMEN’S LIVES: SEX, VIOLENCE, WORK, AND REPRODUCTION, IN WOMEN IN THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY (Ronnie J. Steinberg ed., 1996).  
 2.  For an articulate introduction to this historical-conceptual divide, see generally SARAH 
GAMBLE, THE ROUTLEDGE CRITICAL DICTIONARY OF FEMINISM AND POSTFEMINISM (2000). 
 3. For similar comparison, see Yifat Bitton, Liability of Bias: A Comparative Study of 
Gender-Related Interests in Negligence Law, 16 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 63, 112–15 
(2010) [hereinafter Bitton, Liability of Bias].  
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different patterns of transition that Israeli tort law has undergone following 
the first wave critique.  This inquiry reveals that, after exposing Israeli tort 
law as entrenched in masculine perceptions and inclining to better protect 
men—an argument generally accepted as convincing and reliable—
feminism-derived changes ensued.  These changes are manifested in the way 
the courts understand and construe tort law, turning it into a richer source of 
feminine wealth.  While this process is only just beginning, this article 
recognizes it as a second wave in feminist approach to tort law.  What 
constitutes this trend as a transformative stage is its systematic and traceable 
effects, which are identified here as comprising the alteration of traditional 
doctrines and their expansion to include realms of accountability formerly 
unrecognizable under tort law.  This trend facilitates a larger critical 
intellectual revolution within tort law, rendering feminist approach a 
transformative tool igniting internal critique of tort law.  This praiseworthy 
achievement, however, is moderated by its limitedness, as Chapter Four 
indicates.  The partial success in mainstreaming feminist analysis into tort 
law is due primarily to the fact that systematic gender-based discourse was 
not openly incorporated into tort case law, thereby allowing further 
production of androcentric rulings to linger. 
I.INTRODUCTION 
From both a conceptual and traditional perspective, tort law is 
considered an integral part of “private law” that is based upon a bilateral and 
apolitical foundation.4  This characterization of tort law took shape towards 
the end of the 19th century, during the advent of modern tort law.5  As tort 
law is located conceptually on the private side of the infamous dichotomy 
between private law and public law in Blackstonian6 and libertarian7 
philosophy, two obstacles impede its feminist analysis.  Firstly, all feminist 
analyses of the law are generally hindered by a traditionalist inclination to 
preserve the legal system as formal, scientific, apolitical, and even anti-
 
 4. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *116–17; ERNEST WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF 
PRIVATE LAW 3–6, 8–11, 18–21, 36–38 (1995).  Though people consider Weinrib’s account 
of tort law extremely formalistic, they widely accept the perception underlying it—that tort 
law is private in its essence—in contemporary tort legal theory and adjudication.  See 
generally JULES COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (1992); Richard A. Epstein, The Social 
Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1717 (1982). 
 5. The history of tort law’s development from this intellectual perspective, mainly 
through the philosophical work of Oliver W. Holmes, is considered in EDWARD G. WHITE, 
TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY (2003).  Scholars maintained the bilateral 
virtue of tort law also through fashioning specific doctrines in a way favorable to bilateralism.  
See generally Morton Horwitz, The Rise and Early Progressive Critique of Objective 
Causation, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 471 (David Kairys ed., 1990).   
 6. BLACKSTONE, supra note 4.  Blackstone’s distinction and its rationales are introduced 
in Jerome Hall, Interrelations of Criminal Law and Torts, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 753, 757–58 
(1943). 
 7. CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 90–91 (1988); ZILLAH R. EISENSTEIN, THE 
RADICAL FUTURE OF LIBERAL FEMINISM 41–42 (1993). 
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political.8  Under this premise, the feminist analysis of law is considered a 
manifestation of undoubtedly political interests that are estranged from legal 
reasoning.9  This argument minimizes the ideological importance of feminist 
analysis.  Indeed, rather than acknowledging that the goals of feminist 
analysis are to achieve egalitarian distribution of resources among minority 
groups and to disrupt the unequal balance of power in society, feminist 
analysis is diminished to a mere reflection of a feminine interest in protecting 
“women’s rights.”10  The second obstacle that the feminist analysis of tort 
law encounters is tort law’s function as private law, which thereby provides 
for the vindication of concrete rights in a bilateral dispute.11  As such, 
political considerations that seek to redress the unequal distribution of wealth 
in society should not be considered when determining whether to impose 
responsibility for damages.  Such an approach would violate the rights of the 
parties to have their dispute adjudicated according to their bilateral 
considerations alone.12  Indeed, this notion was considered so fundamental 
to the construction and character of tort law, it also persuaded feminist 
scholars.  Their failure lay in their own criticism between private law and 
public law, embodied in their substantial focus on arenas identified as 
belonging to public law.  It is therefore understandable that feminist analysis 
of tort law was substantially delayed and occurred significantly later than 
other fields deemed to be public law, like family law, labor law13 and 
criminal law, which feminists did thoroughly analyze.  Even today, despite 
 
 8. Positivist philosophers of law primarily advocate this stance.  See, e.g., H. L. A. HART, 
THE CONCEPT OF LAW 79–91, 100–23 (2d ed. 1994).  See generally HANS KELSEN, GENERAL 
THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (1945). 
 9. See generally Jan Cowie, Difference, Dominance, Dilemma: A Critical Analysis of 
Norberg v. Wynrib, 58 SASK. L. REV. 357 (1994). 
 10. Feminist analysis provides comfort for all minority groups.  Moreover, some contend 
that it specifically benefits men.  See generally Nancy Levit, Feminism for Men: Legal 
Ideology and the Construction of Maleness, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1037 (1996). 
 11. This difficulty is therefore unique to the feminist analysis of the private branches of 
law.  It can also be observed in relation to contract law, another classic “private” branch of 
law.  To illustrate this difficulty, see generally Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women 
in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559 (1991); Hila Keren, Equal Contract Law—
A Feminist Reading, 31 MISHPATIM 269 (2000) (Hebrew) [hereinafter Keren, Equal Contract 
Law]; CONTRACT LAW FROM A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE (The Harry and Michael Sacher 
Institute for Legislative Research and Comparative Law, Jerusalem, 2005) (Hebrew); Hila 
Keren, Contractual Rape Under the Anticipated Private Law Codification: Is There Anything 
New Under the Sun?, in STUDIES IN LAW, GENDER AND FEMINISM (Daphna Barak-Erez ed., 
2007) (Hebrew) [hereinafter Keren, Contractual Rape]. 
 12. Though presented in rough terms, the analytical reason behind such an argument is 
nevertheless comprehensive.  Enthusiastic advocacy of this claim can be found in Ernest J. 
Weinrib, Law as a Kantian Idea of Reason, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 472 (1987).  For further 
exploration of commonly held arguments against the re-distributive analysis of tort law and 
their counter-arguments, see generally TSACHI KEREN-PAZ, TORTS, EGALITARIANISM AND 
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE (2007).  
 13. Labor law and family law may be categorized as areas of law that lay somewhere 
between the private and the public, due to the extent to which they are subject to state (family 
law) and federal (labor law) peremptory regulation and close supervision. 
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extensive feminist writings within private spheres of law, it is still apparent 
that feminist analysis focuses predominantly on public law.14 
One of the first feminist writers to reject this approach to tort law was 
Leslie Bender, a prominent analyst of tort law.  Bender decided to forego the 
traditional analytical approaches that differentiated between private and 
public law, choosing instead to apply traditional “feminist questions” to tort 
law.15  Initially, Bender posed two basic questions: firstly, does tort law 
address the unique needs of women, and secondly, do tort law doctrines have 
unique influence upon women?16  Bender was able to conclude that the 
answers to these questions were “no” and “yes,” respectively.  Subsequently, 
she deepened her research in order to determine the extent to which tort law 
doctrines have disregarded the needs of women and the repercussions of this 
disregard.  Others followed Bender’s pioneering analysis, which directed the 
extent and complexity of feminist analysis of tort law.  Importantly, from its 
inception, the intended impact of Bender’s analysis expanded beyond 
women to all groups disadvantaged by tort law, rendering her critique 
universal and more broadly justified.17 
II.THE FIRST WAVE OF TORT-FEMINIST ANALYSIS: 
EXPOSURE 
 The two obstacles mentioned in this section’s introduction largely 
sharped feminist analysis of tort law.  In its initial stages, it was evident that 
the primary goal of feminist analysts was to expose the non-private and 
 
 14. A simple survey of classic legal-feminist writings demonstrates the disproportionate 
focus that the feminist analysis has placed on public law.  See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 1 
(no indication of private law feminist analysis) and Weisberg, supra note 1 (providing a 
comprehensive survey of the applications of feminist legal theory to specific areas of the law 
and feminine life-experiences, yet lacking any reference to private law considerations).  See 
also Keren, Equal Contract Law, supra note 11, at 288–94.  In Israel, an extensive book that 
adopted a feminist analysis of the law attempted to prevent a similar result.  While this was 
the first book to address private law as an important area for feminist analysis, the majority 
of the book still focused on public law (five subdivisions), and only a relatively small part 
focuses on private law (two divisions). See generally DAPHNE BARAK-EREZ ET AL., STUDIES 
ON GENDER, LAW AND FEMINISM (2007). 
 15. The application of feminist questions serves as a useful tool for analyzing the law more 
generally.  See Heather Ruth Wishik, To Question Everything: The Inquiries of Feminist 
Jurisprudence, in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY FOUNDATIONS 22–31 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 
1993).  
 16. Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)Torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts, 
Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L.J. 848, 895–908 (1990) [hereinafter Bender, 
Feminist (Re)Torts].  Later, this question was more directly raised and answered in Martha 
Chamallas, Importing Feminist Theories to Change Tort Law, 11 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 389 
(1997). 
 17. Bender, Feminist (Re)Torts, supra note 16.  Bender addresses methods of altering the 
prevailing account of supposedly equal power relations of parties to a tort action while, in 
reality, substantial power disparities characterize the typical tortfeasor-victim dyad.  Her 
claim was illustrated on the non-gendered topic of mass torts.  This was her early work in the 
area.  The unique quality of her feminist work influenced the patterns of analysis of torts and 
is still acknowledged as influential today, as I will hereby show. 
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political character of tort law.  This approach towards tort law had already 
been established by previous work which portrayed tort law as both 
politicized and public by nature.  As early as the 1930s, several American 
realist intellectuals voiced their criticism of the politicization of private 
law.18  The first to make a claim about tort law’s political nature was realist 
scholar Leon Green.  In his groundbreaking article titled, “Tort Law Public 
Law in Disguise,” Green argued that tort law is used to cultivate public 
interests and serves as a means for social engineering.19  Green’s argument 
was not merely theoretical and descriptive; it was normative.  According to 
his innovative stance, tort law is well suited to function as an arena for 
balancing the competing interests that society deems important.  Indeed, tort 
law ensures that the interests of “the people” involved in every case—
through judges, lawyers, and the jury—are taken into consideration and 
function to set this balance.20  Green’s account of tort law’s politicized nature 
was succeeded over the next two decades by writers from Critical Legal 
Studies (CLS), whose writing also contributed to the understanding that tort 
law has clear political aspects.21  Most prominent was legal historian Morton 
Horwitz’s critique, which argued that tort law has shown, from its modern 
inception, a tendency to advance capitalist values.  Thus arguing, Horwitz’s 
argument extended Green’s analysis.  Horwitz contended that tort law not 
only fostered and promoted capitalist values; it was in fact part of the 
capitalist project itself.  
Against the background of this progressive analysis, the establishment 
of a feminist analysis of tort law was substantially facilitated.  Indeed, the 
feminist analysis is generally considered to have emerged as a jurisprudential 
branch from the CLS.22  Here, too, it adopted the contention that the political 
slant of tort law was self-evident.  This understanding of tort law set the 
conceptual stage for a second layer of analysis, where the pro-masculine 
tendency in tort law was exposed.  As such, despite the two obstacles that 
traditional legal thinking posed, the feminist analysis of tort law succeeded 
 
 18. For seminal work, see Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 
8 (1927); R. L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. 
SCI. Q. 470 (1923). 
 19. Leon Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise (part I), 38 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2–4 (1959); 
Leon Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise (part II), 38 TEX. L. REV. 257, 263–69 (1960). 
 20. Green’s stance was that the voice of “the people” could be identified in the judge’s own 
voice, which exercised political discretion when making decisions in torts.  Green’s realist 
stance, however innovative in its account of tort law as going beyond bilateral boundaries, is 
nevertheless unrealistic.  In it, Green subsequently maintained that the voice of “the people” 
is identical to the voice of the judge, that the judges are unbiased themselves, that there is 
“one voice” reflective of “the people,” and other assumptions of this kind that can be 
considered naïve. 
 21. See generally ABRAHAM HARARI, THE PLACE OF NEGLIGENCE IN THE LAW OF TORTS 
(1962); Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial 
Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50 (1967); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private 
Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976). 
 22. Owen M. Fiss, What Is Feminism?, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 413, 416–23 (1994). 
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in establishing itself as both legitimate and creditable.  In the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, articles presenting a feminist analysis of tort doctrines and its 
application in court began to appear.  These articles were awarded a 
respectable academic stage in reputable journals.23  Among other topics, 
these articles focused on the central doctrine of negligence, liability for 
actions that cause indirect emotional damage, the definition of “a reasonable 
man,” patterns of recognition for the principle of foreseeability, and the 
limitations of compensation for intangible interests.24  The articles argued 
that tort law reflected masculine patterns of thought and lifestyle, and did not 
take into account women’s gendered life experiences and tort-related needs.  
Therefore, the articles not only affirmed that injured women bear an unequal 
burden due to sustaining uniquely feminine harms but also, more 
importantly, these inequalities extended into and were reinforced by tort 
law.25  In other words, despite the primacy of feminist analysis in law, many 
complex measures that influenced women stood in the way of exposing the 
gender bias that existed in tort law.  Within the realm of tort liability, women 
suffered bias and had less legal protection than their male counterparts.  
Outside of the boundaries of tort law, this was used to reproduce and deepen 
androcentric stereotypes in society, which were integral parts of the 
disadvantaged position in which women were placed.  
With the advancement of this focused analysis of tort law, a wider meta-
theoretical critique of tort law began to take shape.  This analysis that united 
a body of recognized and consistent critics, such as Martha Chamallas, 
Lucinda Finley, Anita Bernstein, and others, did not limit itself to one 
doctrine or another, or to a particular scandalous verdict, but began to express 
itself in more inclusive language that exposed the systemic masculine biases 
within tort law.26  
Pursuant to the influence that U.S. feminist analysis of law had on Israeli 
general legal analysts, it was not surprising to discover that similar patterns 
of masculine biases existed in Israel and, in some cases, even more 
 
 23. See generally Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women’s Issues in 
a Torts Course, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 41 (1989); Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, 
Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814 (1990); Elizabeth 
Handsley, Mental Injury Occasioned by Harm to Another: A Feminist Critique, 14 LAW & 
INEQ. 391 (1996); Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136 (1992); Anita 
Bernstein, Better Living Through Crime and Tort, 76 B.U. L. REV. 169 (1996). 
 24. See generally Lisa M. Ruda, Caps on Noneconomic Damages and the Female Plaintiff: 
Heeding the Warning Signs, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 197 (1993); Barbara Y. Welke, 
Unreasonable Women: Gender and the Law of Accidental Injury, 1870–1920, 19 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 369 (1994); Leslie Bender & Perette Lawrence, Is Tort Law Male?: Foreseeability 
Analysis and Property Managers’ Liability for Third Party Rapes of Residents, 69 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 313 (1993). 
 25. See generally Anita Bernstein, Restatement (Third) of Torts: General Principles and 
the Prescription of Masculine Order, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1367 (2001). 
 26. See generally Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort 
Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 463 (1998); Leslie Bender, An Overview of Feminist Tort 
Scholarship, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 575 (1993). 
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intensely.27  Like their U.S. counterparts, Israeli feminists first explored 
branches of public law and, two decades later, expanded their critique to 
branches of private law.28  American influence was also evident in the initial 
preoccupation with detailed doctrines of tort law, which only subsequently 
developed into a broader analysis of the whole field: At first, the analysis 
was critical of the elements of reasonability and foreseeability in negligence 
law as failing to reflect life experiences that could be identified as “feminine” 
and patterns of societal conduct that primarily pertained to women, such as 
rape and domestic violence.29  As it grew deeper, the analysis pointed out 
that tort law did not recognize intangible harms, which women 
predominantly incur, and also did not provide compensation for such 
damages.30  The analysis also criticized “neutral” tort patterns that 
demonstrated gender biases when considered within the framework of 
female life experiences, such as giving birth.31  In the final stage, the analysis 
called for a reevaluation of tort liability to take into account the gender power 
relations in shaping its doctrines, and for the acknowledgment that tort law 
should serve more prominently as recourse for alleviating the systematic 
suffering that characterizes women’s lives.32  Once feminist analysis 
penetrated Israeli tort law, the field started taking a slow yet traceable new 
turn in its development.33 
 
 27. For the influence American feminist thought and research patterns has had on the 
Israeli feminist development, see generally Leora Bilski, Cultural Importation: he 
Occurrence of Feminism in Israel, 25 IYUNEY MISHPAT 523 (2002) (Hebrew). 
 28. While feminist analysis of public law branches became prominent in Israel during the 
1980s, the first article to entertain feminist analysis of private law was published only in the 
year 2000.  Keren, Equal Contract Law, supra note 11 (criticizing the court’s refusal to 
incorporate notions of equality into contract law doctrines).  Before this article, an article 
criticizing the gendered notion of the “reasonable man” in criminal law addressed, 
incidentally, tort law’s origin of this legal construct.  See Orit Kamir, How Reasonability 
Killed the Woman: The Heated Blood of the “Reasonable Man” and the “Reasonable 
Woman” in the Doctrine of Teasing, 6 PLILIM 137 (1997) (Hebrew).  
 29. See generally Yifat Bitton, “Feminine Life-Experience” and the Foreseeability of 
Harm, 33 MISHPATIM 585 (2003) (Hebrew) [hereinafter Bitton, Foreseeability of Harm].  
 30. Daphne Barak-Erez, Constitutional Torts in the Basic Law Era, 9 MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 
103, 121–22 (2005) (Hebrew).  See generally Yifat Bitton, Dignity Aches—Compensating 
Constitutional Intangible Harms, 9 MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 137 (2005) (Hebrew) [hereinafter 
Bitton, Dignity Aches]; Yifat Bitton, The Worth of Tears—Protecting Gender-Related 
Interests in Negligence Law, in READING IN GENDER, LAW AND FEMINISM 233 (Daphne Barak-
Erez et al. eds., 2007) (Hebrew). 
 31. See generally Tsachi Keren-Paz, A Feminist-Distributive Gaze over the Duty of Care 
of Pregnant Women: Ideology, Symbolism and Pragmatism, in READING IN GENDER, LAW AND 
FEMINISM 321 (Daphne Barak-Erez et al. eds., 2007) (Hebrew). 
 32. See generally Yifat Bitton, Bringing Power Relations Within the Scope of Negligence 
Liability, 37 MISHPATIM 1 (2008) (Hebrew) [hereinafter Bitton, Power Relations]. 
 33. Due to space constraints, and to my wish to be able to present an overarching review 
of the contribution feminist critique has made to the reshaping of this legal field, the 
discussion herein will focus on Israeli tort law alone. 
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III.THE SECOND WAVE OF FEMINIST TORT ANALYSIS: 
MODIFICATION AND EXPANSION 
Determining the importance of the modification that each of the waves 
of feminist analysis has generated in tort law would be impossible, as each 
stage depended on the preceding one.  The argument is substantively 
circular.34  The stages interwove so closely with one another that they have 
become inextricably linked.  Their contributions must therefore be 
considered as one single contribution.  However, if it were possible to rank 
the contributions of the various stages separately, according to the extent to 
which they have each enriched the understanding of tort law, the second 
stage would undoubtedly be ranked the highest.  Its distinction lies in the fact 
that it enabled the change and expansion of tort law in a way that not only 
deepened the influence of feminist analysis, but also allowed for a greater 
understanding of it, and for the formation of new, creative, and important 
areas in tort law for the betterment of women.  
In order to integrate the feminist analysis, this advanced stage required 
both theoretical and practical work in relation to tort law.  As such, this stage 
worked on fertile ground.  Israeli tort law experienced dramatic expansion 
over the last two decades, with the last decade in particular being almost 
unparalleled in the rest of the world.  Out of the multitude of examples 
representing this phenomenal change, here are a few central ones: as opposed 
to the general trend in common law countries, the courts extended the 
protection of tort law in Israel to cases where diverse uncertainties governed 
the causal relation between the plaintiff and the defendant;35 one court found 
a father liable for intangible damage he had caused to his children as a result 
of “fatherhood neglect,” a precedent that had never before occurred 
worldwide;36 the judiciary expanded the element of foreseeability to cases 
where it was impossible to find precedent to similar harmful facts elsewhere 
in the world;37 the court also recognized the protection of a patient’s 
autonomy, regardless of whether the medical procedure he underwent was 
successful or not.38  These examples and many others of their kind reflected 
 
 34. This idea is generally reflected in a recent and ambitious project of laying out holistic 
feminist critique of tort law in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAW (Janice Richardson & 
Erika Rackley eds., 2012).  
 35. The following cases most clearly present this trend: HCJ 1639/01 Maayan Zvi 
Communal Residence v. Krischov 58(5) PD 215 [2004] (Isr.) (uncertainty as to the material 
cause of the injury); HCJ 361/00 Daher v. Deputy Yoav 59(4) PD 310 [2005] (Isr.) (lack of 
evidence proving the cause of harm was ignored by applying the loss of evidence doctrine); 
HCJ 7375/02 Carmel Hospital v. Malul 60(1) PD 11 [2005] (Isr.), restricted by HCJ 4693/05 
Carmel Hospital v. Malul (Aug. 29, 2010), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.) 
(Additional Review). 
 36. HCJ 2034/98 Amin v. Amin 53(5) PD 69 [1999] (Isr.). 
 37. HCJ 7794/98 Moshe v. Klipford 57(4) PD 721 [2003] (Isr.) (Additional Review).  
Prominent Israeli tort scholars found this decision to overly expand the limits of tort liability 
to remote harms.  See generally Ehud Guttel & Israel Gilead, Expanding Liability Through 
Causation—A Critical View, 34 MISHPATIM 385 (2004) (Hebrew).  
 38. HCJ 2781/93 Daaka v. Carmel Hospital 53(4) PD 526 [1999] (Isr.). 
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a decade in the development of Israeli tort law which saw its expansion into 
new areas of accountability, some of which were completely new, and others 
from which plaintiffs had previously been barred.  This development of 
Israeli tort law facilitated and eased the integration of the feminist analysis 
of tort law both theoretically and practically.  It is important to note the 
bilateral relationship between the theoretical approach and practical 
implementation of the feminist analysis in the Israeli case.  Indeed, the 
former ensured that plaintiffs filed appropriate claims to advance the 
feminist analysis, and also in cooperation with it.  As I will later demonstrate, 
it is possible to mark a significant feminist contribution to the development 
of a unique pattern of influence on tort law. 
A. FEMINIST TORT ANALYSIS DRIVEN MODIFICATIONS 
The influence that feminist analysis had over changes in tort law was 
versatile.  Since feminist analysis itself is rich and relevant to various 
analytical approaches, the result of its permeation into tort law was diverse 
and varied.  In this section of the article, I intend to present the most 
noticeable and important changes this permeation instigated.  
1. Legislative Change 
Despite appearing counterintuitive to the judiciary’s normative strength 
in common law tort law systems, it seems that legislative reform was the 
simplest way to amend tort law to accommodate some of the missing female 
and feminist elements.  The first identified case of adopting a feminist 
analysis to tort law was the enactment of Sexual Harassment Prevention Act 
of 1998.39  Similar to Anglo-American tort law, legal precedents through the 
common law system primarily shaped the development of Israeli tort law, 
which therefore required a gradual learning process by the judiciary.  
Conversely, the advantage of the external virtue of a statute enacted as a 
consequence of feminist lobbying was clear.  Since women predominantly 
experience sexual harassment, prohibiting sexual harassment and providing 
a mechanism by which victims can recover compensation for its harmful 
effects demonstrated a clear injection of feminist conceptualization into tort 
law.40  Moreover, to overcome traditional conceptual and practical barriers, 
the law established a mechanism for easy compensation to which a claimant 
was almost automatically entitled once sexual harassment was proved; the 
element of damage and its details did not need to be proven.41  This 
mechanism was specifically useful for sexual harassment victims, in light of 
 
 39. Sexual Harassment Prevention Act, 5748-1998, SH No. 1661 p.166 (Isr.).  
 40. The statute provides that both sexual harassment and associated adverse treatment 
constitute compensable torts.  See Articles 3 and 6(a) of the statute, respectively.  
 41. Provision 6(b) of the statute provides that: “the court may grant . . . a sum not exceeding 
120,000 IS, without proof of harm.”  Sexual Harassment Prevention Act, 5748-1998, SH No. 
1661 p.166 (Isr.) as amended by Sexual Harassment Prevention Act (Amendment no. 9), 
5773-2013, SH No.2406, p.203 (Isr.). 
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the fact that the typical harms they sustain are incompatible with tort law’s 
infamous adherence to protecting against physical harms.42  Applying a 
broad definition to determining what constitutes sexual harassment and 
recognizing its inherent harms, the legislation incorporated a feminist 
approach and influence upon tort law.  
The legislative process involved the adaptation and recognition of the 
statute from outside the framework of traditional tort law,43 and the statute 
proclaimed to be an integral part of tort law.44  Notwithstanding its efficient 
incorporation into tort law, the process became a double-edged sword.45  
Indeed, as the genesis of the statute did not follow the traditional “from 
within” development of tort law, it was left standing as an “outsider” to tort 
law’s common collective and its implementation was ill-suited.46  
The problems associated with the Act were sufficiently serious to 
warrant the appointment of a public committee whose mandate was to 
recommend extensive changes to improve the Act’s effectiveness.47  Many 
put forth suggestions regarding the reasons for the courts’ failure in 
upholding the legislation.48  I would like to propose my own contention: The 
courts failed to uphold the legislation due to (1) the statute’s development 
outside of the framework of traditional tort law and (2) the dearth of 
 
 42.  See generally Richard L. Abel, Should Tort Law Protect Property Against Accidental 
Loss?, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 79 (1986). 
 43. For a detailed analysis of the formulation and development of this statute, see generally 
Orit Kamir, What Kind of Harassment: Is Sexual Harassment a Violation of Equality or 
Human Dignity?, 29 MISHPATIM 317 (1998); Noya Rimalt, Stereotyping Women, 
Individualizing Harassment: The Dignitary Paradigm of Sexual Harassment Law Between 
the Limits of Law and the Limits of Feminism, 19 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 391 (2008). 
 44. Provision 6 of the statute states: “an action against this law should be deemed tortious 
and be adjudicated according to the Tort Ordinance.”  Sexual Harassment Prevention Act, 
5748-1998, SH No. 1661 p.166 (Isr.). 
 45. For using this advantage within tort law, see Epstein, supra note 4, at 1725–26.  
Epstein’s argument, conceptual and normative in nature, is that it will bring about systematic 
change more efficiently than through the routine use of case law. 
 46. My analysis here focuses on assessing the law solely from a tort law perspective.  In 
other terms, such as socially, the statute had strong positive impact on educating the Israeli 
public to regard sexual harassment as unacceptable.  See generally Orit Kamir, The Israeli 
Law Against Sexual Harassment—Where Are We After a Decade?, 9 LAW AND BUSINESS 9 
(2008) (Hebrew). 
 47. Israeli Parliament member Gila Gamliel originally sponsored the Committee on Sexual 
Harassment, which was established in 2009.  The author of this article was nominated as one 
of its members.  
 48. Sharp critique of the statute as promoting moral cleanliness rather than abolishing 
power relations is offered in Noya Rimalt, About Sex, Sexuality and Respect: Sexual 
Harassment Law and Feminist Theory Test Legal Reality, 35 MISHPATIM 601 (2005) 
(Hebrew) and Noya Rimalt, On Law, Feminism and Social Change: The Case of the 
Prevention of Sexual Harassment, STUDIES IN GENDER AND FEMINISM 985 (2007) (Hebrew).  
For like contention regarding the prevailing account of sexual harassment statutes, see 
generally Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998).  
It appears that even Orit Kamir, the leader of the law’s legislative process, who is considered 
its “spiritual mother,” recognizes that it has failed to fulfill some of its expectations.  Kamir, 
supra note 43, at 64–71. 
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translating its progressive feminist terms to familiar “tort” language to 
enable and ease absorption into the field.  One example of this deficiency is 
the neglect to treat the damage sexual harassment causes as consequential, 
as opposed to inherent, and to refrain from establishing a set of measurable 
parameters to assess its monetary value.49 
Despite these misgivings, the Sexual Harassment Prevention Act has 
been firstly and importantly a step in openly using the tort arena as means to 
achieve gender equality.  It has opened the conceptual door to recognizing 
tort law’s potential to protect women from oft-encountered female suffering.  
2. Modifying Existing Doctrines and Reading Them Anew: Gender 
Mainstreaming 
The idea of mainstreaming gender, as it was conceptualized in 
international feminist work, is to produce patterns of thought to which gender 
insights are integral.50  Under prevalent political thought, it is assumed that 
“feminist insights” should be limited to areas that can be systemically 
identified as “feminine by nature,” such as rape or birth.  Feminists’ call for 
mainstreaming, however, goes against this grain of thought; they stress that 
people should consider gender implications of political, legislative, and 
judicial decisions in all areas of life, and not confine these insights within an 
explicit relationship to gender.  Indeed, examples of gender-based thinking 
can be found in areas that do not directly deal with life experiences that are 
essentially “feminine.”51   
 
 49. See generally Bitton, Dignity Aches, supra note 30.  In this respect, the Sexual 
Harassment Prevention Act differs from other laws of tortious nature located outside the 
Israeli main statutory tort source, namely The Tort Ordinance (New Version), 5728-1968, 10 
LSI 266 (1968) (Isr.).  Such laws include, inter alia, the Defamation Act, 5725-1965, SH No. 
464 p. 240 (Isr.) and the Car Accident Physical Injury Act, 5735-1975, SH No.780 p. 234 
(Isr.).  The geneses of these statutes reflect a process working “from the inside to the outside.” 
That is, they shield interests traditionally recognized and protected under tort law.  
Defamation is one of the oldest injustices tort law recognizes, and car accidents used to be 
administered within the framework of the tort of negligence, until both topics were assigned 
a separate statutory framework meant to better fit their protectionist function.  In this sense, 
sexual harassment, as a cause of action, was “forced” onto tort law, in an opposite process of 
working “from the outside to the outside.”  This external legislative manner was dictated by 
virtue of it being unfamiliar to tort law. 
 50. Gender mainstreaming was thus defined by the United Nations Report of the Economic 
and Social Council for 1997, A/52/3 (Sept. 18, 1997):  
Mainstreaming a gender perspective is the process of assessing the 
implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, 
policies or programs, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making 
women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of 
the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and 
programs in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and 
men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to 
achieve gender equality. 
 51. To learn more about the concept of feminine life experience, see Robin West, 
Jurisprudence and Gender 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 14 (1988). 
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The notion of gender mainstreaming is particularly valuable in feminist 
analysis of tort law, an area that appears gender neutral, for two reasons.  
Firstly, there is great value in exposing the gendered nature and significance 
of what is mistakenly thought of as “neutral laws,” as shown by the 
influential work done in the earlier stages of feminist analysis.  Secondly, 
analyzing the significance of tort doctrines to women should be introduced 
to the most prosaic patterns of legal analysis—those the courts routinely 
practice—which go unchallenged.  This is the essence of feminist 
mainstreaming in law.  It does not necessarily stem from dramatic direct and 
premeditated feminist attack of patriarchal constructs that ultimately became 
monumental feminist victories—such as the cases of enlisting women into 
the Israeli Air Force,52 or appointing women to religious councils53—in order 
to awaken feminist insights.  Rather, feminist mainstreaming uses 
commonplace events, such as a car accident.  This is the most challenging 
bottom-up approach feminist analysis of tort law uniquely offers to changing 
existing law.  Drawing on Hanna Arendt’s notion of “The Banality of Evil,” 
I consider such analysis to offer us a glance at the nature of tort law as 
requiring ongoing feminist critique of its trivialities.  
An example of the virtues of this approach is the case of a male plaintiff 
who was involved in a car accident and whose case sparked feminist 
discussion.  The case of Pedro v. Midgal Insurance Ltd.54 began, like many 
others, as a routine claim in an Israeli district court following the horrors of 
a car accident.  The plaintiff, a 22-year-old man, had been seriously injured 
in the accident, and consequently incurred severe functional disability.  
Among other things, he suffered urological injuries, which were expected to 
cause him sexual dysfunction for the rest of his life.  As part of his 
compensation under the tort system, he requested funding for sexual 
treatment by a sexual surrogate, who would teach him how to regain 
engagement in sexual relations with women.55  His request was rejected.  
Rather, the district court, acting on its own initiative, deemed the youth’s 
injury to be “impotence,” and ruled that he ought to be compensated for such 
damage with medicinal treatment and/or referral to an escort.  By analogizing 
 
 52. HCJ 4541/94 Miller v. Minister of Defense 49(4) PD 94 [1995] (Isr.). 
 53. HCJ 153/87 Shakdiel v. Minister of Religious Affairs 42(2) PD 221 [1988] (Isr.). 
 54. HCJ 11152/04 Pedro v. Migdal Insurance Ltd. 61(3) PD 310 [2006] (Isr.). 
 55. Sex Surrogates are (mainly) women who use practical-physical therapeutic methods to 
facilitate others with desired satisfying sexual skills.  See generally R. Aloni, O. Keren, & S. 
Katz, Sex Therapy Surrogate Partners for Individuals with Very Limited Functional Ability 
Following Traumatic Brain Injury, 25 SEXUALITY & DISABILITY 125 (2007).  The 
effectiveness of this practice is professionally questioned.  See Dean C. Dauw, Evaluating the 
Effectiveness of the SECS’ Surrogate-Assisted Sex Therapy Model, 24 J. SEX RES. 269, 269–
74 (1988).  Feminist critique questions the ethics of surrogacy, even when intended for 
medical purposes.  See generally Joan Mahony, An Essay on Surrogacy and Feminist 
Thought, 16 J.L. MED & ETHICS 81 (2007).  
YIFAT (DO NOT DELETE) 4/3/2014  5:11 PM 
234 HASTINGS WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25:2 
medical treatment and the use of a prostitute,56  the court bestowed mystical 
therapeutic merits to the ill-reputed experience of exploiting women’s bodies 
in a brothel.57  
In recognizing that using the services of a prostitute is a legitimate 
category of compensation, the court did not set a new precedent.  Rather, the 
judgment joined a series of other cases in which the courts awarded 
claimants, who were all men, damages for the purpose of employing the 
services of prostitutes.58  Indeed, the courts routinely awarded such 
compensation as simply another component of the customary “compensation 
package.”59  More to the point, the Pedro case made its way to the Supreme 
Court only because the rivaling parties both appealed the amount of 
compensation the lower court eventually awarded the plaintiff.60  It was only 
then that the head of damage discussed was conceptualized as problematic.  
The court began its analysis by interpreting this head of damage from an 
internal tort perspective.  As such, it reclassified the claimant’s sexual injury 
by utilizing the grammatical rules of torts, therefore categorizing it as non-
pecuniary, as opposed to the pecuniary trait the district court assigned to it.  
Such a move would have sufficed in order to disqualify this head of damage, 
which the district court calculated according to the estimated costs of paying 
a prostitute for regular sexual encounters.  However, the court, under Chief 
Deputy Justice Rivlin, did not stop there.  In the second stage of evaluation, 
Justice Rivlin’s progressive analysis focused on how acknowledging such 
head of damage in tort law constitutes the district court’s indirect recognition 
of prostitution and its normalization as a consequence.  From thereon, the 
 
 56. I deliberately chose to use the term “prostitution” because the courts’ use of the 
euphemism “escort services” serves to sanitize the abhorrent social phenomenon of paying a 
woman for the entitlement to use her body sexually.  
 57. CC (TA) 1553/99 Pedro v. Migdal Insurance Ltd., (Oct. 26, 2004) Nevo Legal 
Database (by subscription) (Isr.).  See particularly ¶ 7 in Judge Pilpel’s decision. 
 58. The plaintiffs in these cases were predominantly—not to say only—men who sought 
redress for the harm they suffered due to the injury of their sexual pleasure.  See Justice 
Rivlin’s review of the available case law, id., ¶¶ 12–14.  Thus, this area of compensation is 
constructed as gender oriented, where men are practically the sole beneficiaries of human 
sexual pleasure.  Moreover, in the few reported Israeli cases in which a woman plaintiff has 
invoked sexual surrogacy, the courts declined her plea by adding a new demand to allow 
compensation for this damage, stating that she needed to prove her specific interest in 
pursuing this type of relief.  Like demand has not been used before or after this decision was 
given.  CC (Hi) 709/93 Mizrahi v. Lion Insurance LTD (Aug. 8, 1999), Nevo Legal Database 
(by subscription) (Isr.); CC (Jerusalem) 1686/96 Avraham v. Mayaney Hayeshua Hospital 
(July 27, 2006), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).  
 59. Justice Rivlin presented in his decision the sum of damages granted in the past for 
plaintiffs in like cases.  HCJ 11152/04 Pedro v. Migdal Insurance Ltd., ¶ 8. 
 60. In cases where the court did not award this compensation component, it was due to 
evidence related difficulties regarding proof of the harm rather than substance related 
considerations, which Justice Rivlin’s survey showed.  Only one justice refused to cooperate 
with this compensation method, which he defined as contrary to public policy in CC 1102/94 
Dayan v. Fund for Compensating Victims of Car Accidents (Aug. 1, 1999), Nevo Legal 
Database (by subscription) (Isr.).  Interestingly, this was the same judge who also gave an 
important feminist ruling in a case regarding gang rape, which is discussed infra Section 1.3. 
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court appeared to transcend formal tort law discourse and proceeded to 
describe the horrors of prostitution and of sex trafficking that prevails in 
Israel, praising the uncompromising national efforts to erode it by both legal 
and executive means.61  
Still, this judgment did not remain outside of the law of torts.  Upon 
establishing the harms of prostitution and sex trafficking in Israel, the court 
returned to tort law.  Paraphrasing the principle of restitution in integrum 
underlying tort law, Justice Rivlin declared, “Not every status deserves being 
restored.”62  In this way, the court activated a socially contextual feminist 
analysis of the most fundamental principle of tort law, according to which 
its basic objective is to put the successful plaintiff in the position he or she 
would have been had the tortious action not been committed.63  The court 
applied the principle of public policy as an obligatory interpretation which 
seeks to ensure that women are not injured as a consequence of tort law and, 
based on this interpretation, rejected such a head of damage since it would 
be tainted by illegal actions and the exploitation of women in prostitution, 
which injures their basic rights.64  Moreover, the court’s obligation to 
women’s suffering in prostitution was not based on an ethical approach 
disgusted by the immorality of prostitution, but rather on a fear of the 
exploitation of women through prostitution.  Justice Rivlin’s offered 
clarification made it evident that, if the court maintains this interpretation 
under the paradigm of exploitation, this interpretation will correctly guide 
other tort verdicts that might touch upon the issue of prostitution.  For 
 
 61. The reason for this change in perception is not visible in the judgment of the case.  It 
is likely, however, that the amicus curiae the Legal Clinic for Women’s Rights filed, which 
clarified the significant feminist value of the issue, contributed to this change.  It is important 
to note that, within the Israeli feminist community, the prevailing stance is that prostitution is 
inherently oppressive and exploitive, and perpetuates the subjugation of women as sexual 
objects used to pleasure men.  See NAOMI LEVENKRON & YOSSI DAHAN, HAIFA FEMINIST CTR. 
& ADVA CTR., A HUMAN EXCHANGE: TRAFFICKING OF WOMEN IN ISRAEL 14–16 (2003).  The 
Supreme Court reinforced this stance in its rulings.  See, e.g., HCJ 3520/91 Turgeman v. The 
State of Israel, 47(1) PD 441 [1993] (Isr.); HCJ 2885/93 Tomer v. The State of Israel, 48(1) 
PD 635 [1994] (Isr.).  Justice Rivlin’s approach can be easily associated with this perception 
of prostitution as invariably negative.  In accordance with this approach, he opined that 
providing compensation for damages under the tortious guise of restoring the victim’s 
position prior to the tortious conduct is immoral and would therefore be contrary to the 
principle of “public policy.”  Justice Rivlin further added that such disposition “is likely to 
influence the implementation of the principle of ‘restoration’ where the previous state or 
condition involves illegality or injury to the basic values of society.”  HCJ 11152/04 Pedro v. 
Migdal Insurance Ltd., ¶¶ 19–21.  Justice Rivlin repeatedly expresses this position in the 
ruling.  Chief Justice Barak, on the other hand, left the issue of recognizing “escort services” 
as unresolved compensation.  Justice Beinisch (a woman) concurred and agreed in principle 
with Justice Rivlin’s public policy concerns, though qualified it by stating there was still left 
a “question of whether there is an exception to the wide rule, and if so, we leave the scope of 
this exception for a future discussion.”  Id. 
 62. HCJ 11152/04 Pedro v. Migdal Insurance Ltd., ¶¶19-21. 
 63. Common law case law first recognized this maxim.  See the famous saying by Lord 
Blackburn in Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co., 5 App. Cas. 25, 39 (1880). 
 64. HCJ 11152/04 Pedro v. Migdal Insurance Ltd., ¶¶16–21. 
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example, if a case requires acknowledgment of a woman’s income as a 
prostitute, the court will not withhold compensation for that woman’s 
injuries simply because of the negative connotation of prostitution.65  
The court’s usage of two methods of interpretation revealed that the 
relative strength of external feminist analysis added a crucial socio-legal 
perspective to what existing internal-interpretational tort law analysis has to 
offer in like cases.66  Feminist analysis further enables drawing a line 
between the myriad appearances of a singular oppressive method—treating 
the quest for compensation as a quest for prostitution sponsorship—and 
between different oppressive practices held against women within the legal 
system.67  Additionally, the implementation of a feminist analysis managed 
to penetrate one of the most basic principles of tort law: restoring the tort 
victims to their previous position.  This acknowledgement was also 
expressed in the amount of compensation that the court eventually awarded 
to the plaintiff, which the court reduced by a third and limited it to financial 
damage that included medicinal and psychological treatment of his sexual 
disability.68  In this way, the court used feminist analysis as a tool for 
reshaping the limits of tort law in a sphere where the prevalent and almost 
tabooed legal maxim was never challenged before.  
3. The Endorsement of New Lawsuits While Using Traditional Torts 
One of the simplest arguments against the feminist analysis of tort law 
is that, while it smears tort law for estranging women, the fact remains that 
 
 65. HCJ 11152/04 Pedro v. Migdal Insurance Ltd., ¶ 22. 
 66. To validate my analysis of Justice Rivlin’s denial of the compensation as composed of 
two distinctive views, see the restricted consent clause that Chief Justice Barak proposed at 
the end of the verdict, where he asked to join only the first formal-interpretive version Justice 
Rivlin proposed.  In contrast, Justice Beinisch, who reputedly used to be in strong favor of 
feminist analysis, made it clear that she joined Justice Rivlin’s second argument, and even 
declared it to be “proper judicial policy,” which she demanded the lower courts to adopt.  HCJ 
11152/04 Pedro v. Migdal Insurance Ltd. 
 67. Zvi Trigger used feminist analysis of this case to correlate the quest for prostitution 
sponsorship with the inferior status of women in Israeli socio-legal sphere, where in some 
respects, women are utterly perceived as part of men’s property.  Zvi Trigger, Israeli Legal 
System is One: Family Law and Women Trafficking in Israel as Belonging to a Singular 
Continuum, in THE DALIA DORNER BOOK 363 (2009). 
 68. HCJ 11152/04 Pedro v. Migdal Insurance Ltd., ¶ 15 (Justice Rivlin): 
There is room to order compensation for loss to a plaintiff whose ability to 
have sexual relations has been harmed, when the use of a drug or a meeting 
with a doctor, psychologist or psychiatrist (and even, perhaps, a sexual 
surrogate—as we said, we are not expressing an opinion on this matter) may 
help him to improve his condition.  However, beyond that, it seems that the 
remedy that tort law is offering to rectify this type of damage is without a 
purpose. It is doubtful if you can categorize escort services as a corrective 
relief measured against the loss involved in the loss of the ability to have 
sexual relations.  You cannot compare a sexual encounter with a call-girl to 
the remedy of a medicine or a meeting with a psychologist, for example, for 
the latter—the medicine and the meeting with the psychologist—have a clear 
evidence-based purpose of therapy or rehabilitation, and therefore, are part of 
the recognized index of monetary damages. 
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women have rarely initiated actions using classic and simple torts, which 
could easily be used to serve them.  In Israel, tort law was almost never used 
as an independent cause of action to seek recourse for the widespread 
violence against women, even under obvious frameworks, such as the crime 
of assault.69  Similar scarcity of “feminine lawsuits” is apparent also in the 
United States.70  This reality could imply that the problem does not lie within 
tort law’s androcentric nature, but rather within women themselves, who, 
due to some sort of cultural process external to tort law, decide not to utilize 
it to seek recourse for their suffering.  This argument is most challenging 
when tort claims are absent in arenas controlled by typical harmful feminine 
life experiences, such as gender-driven violence.71  And indeed, ample 
reasons for this circumstance can be offered that are external to tort law’s 
inherent limited accessibility to women and to its unsuitability to their 
needs.72  Nevertheless, it is important to point out that despite the number of 
 
 69. This statement is excepted by the small, but existing, usage of civil suits as incidental 
to deciding upon a criminal procedure and following it as part of the criminal procedure, by 
virtue of article 77A of The Law of the Courts.  The Law of the Courts [Consolidated 
Version], 5744-1984, SH No.1123 p.198 (Isr.).  These accompanying claims, however, do not 
allow a substantive discussion of tort law, but narrow the discussion to the question of 
assessing the crime victim’s harm and its compensation rate.  Another tort-like measure for 
compensating victims of criminal offenses is provided by article 77(a) to the Penal Code, 
5737-1977, SH No. 864 p.226 (Isr.), which enables ordering the convict to pay compensation 
to the victim in criminal proceedings.  However, this provision, was identified by the supreme 
court as criminal and not tortbased; and, in the rare cases it is applied by courts, it normally 
yields fairly symbolic amounts of compensation which cannot realistically provide reparation 
to the victims.  CA 2976/01 Assaf v. The State of Israel, 56(3) PD 418, 433–438 [2002] (Isr.).  
Previous research from 2005 revealed that the average compensation sum ordered by courts 
under this mechanism was 5,000 IS.  See YIFAT BITTON, RE-READING TORT LAW FROM A 
FEMINIST-EGALITARIAN PERSPECTIVE 302 (Dissertation, submitted to the Hebrew University 
Senate, 2005) (Hebrew).  For the sake of proportionality, one should bear in mind that the 
statute itself arms the court with the power to grant up to approximately 250,000 IS for every 
criminal count.  See article 77(a) of The Penal Code, 5737-1977, SH No. 864 p. 226 (Isr.).  
The up–to-date sum is expected to be somewhat higher, as more awareness regarding the 
importance of this mechanism has been raised through feminist lobby.  
 70. Research conducted in the U.S. reveals a significantly low level of usage of tort claims 
by women victims of sexual attacks.  See Jennifer B. Wriggins, Toward a Feminist Revision 
of Torts, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 139, 155 (2005). 
 71. Making this distinction between sexual violence and gender violence, I intend to 
separate two types of violence that are often, but not always, closely tied to each other: gender 
violence stems from gender power relations.  It serves and reflects them at the same time, and 
does not necessarily have to be attached to sexual assault.  For example, a woman who is 
murdered by a spouse is a victim of gender violence.  Sexual violence, on the other hand, 
though also stemming from gender power relations, focuses on sexual assault or is sexual in 
the manner in which it is carried out. 
 72. It is common to use external explanations of tort law, such as the claim of lack of 
solvency of the defendant, or alternative mechanisms to receive compensation, like a derived 
civil suit.  These arguments seem to me to be weak, and it is difficult to explain the total lack 
of these claims from the perspective of our legal system.  For further explanations, see 
Douglas D. Scherer, Tort Remedies for Victims of Domestic Abuse, 43 S.C. L. REV. 543, 543 
(1992).  Scherer believes that the reason for the lack of such claims is lawyers’ lack of 
understanding of the potential embedded in tort law and their fear that immunities exist, which 
would prevent such claims being successful.  Id. 
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hypothetical suggestions to explain this phenomenon, researchers have 
categorically proven women’s lack of access to tort law, as it stands today, 
in a manner that can be reasonably assumed to have direct bearing on 
women’s non-usage of tort claims.73  For example, it has been argued that 
even for the most seemingly straightforward tort transgressions that 
supposedly lack a gender context or bias, like assault and battery, the 
construction of this tort limits women’s ability to use it to compensate them 
for sexual assault that did not consist of constant physical harm.74  Other 
researchers pointed out the masculine manner in which the notion of 
foreseeability is construed, thereby excluding feminine experience from the 
ambit of tort law’s protection.75  Different research demonstrated that the 
mental damage that characterizes women who have been sexually assaulted 
is completely misunderstood, and consequently is rarely recognized, and 
only merits low quantities of compensation.76  One researcher even claimed 
that the inaptness of tort law to protect women warrants instituting 
mandatory insurance systems to protect them from violence.77  
One of the ways to break the tradition of absence of tort cases is to file 
“feminine” lawsuits that would challenge the boundaries of tort law and 
allow its development in order to afford women adequate protection under 
its auspices.  Parallel to the conceptual development tort law has undergone 
from a theoretical feminine perspective, and to complement the process, it 
became necessary to affect the process “on the ground” by filing suits in 
traditional areas of tort law, to fully assess their ability to accommodate 
feminine claims.78  This bottom-up work was designed to ensure that female 
victims of violence could overcome their aversion to the legal process as a 
formal male-oriented means of minimizing their suffering and reducing their 
personal experience into a cold-minded monetary calculus.  The aim instead 
was to transform this fearful experience into a series of robust legal 
arguments that would result in a monetary award to be used for their overall 
rehabilitation.  As this experience unfolded, it became clearer that women 
did not demonstrate reluctance to use tort law for no reason; rather, the courts 
were reluctant to give them an appropriate recourse for their suits.  Under 
 
 73. See generally Julie Goldscheid, Gender-Motivated Violence: Developing a Meaningful 
Paradigm for Civil Rights Enforcement, 22 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 123 (1999). 
 74. See generally Joanne Conaghan, Gendered Harms and the Law of Tort: Remedying 
(Sexual) Harassment, 16 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 407 (1996).  Tort law’s inability to protect 
against such injury is further discussed in CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 74–164 (1979). 
 75. Bender & Lawrence, supra note 24. 
 76. Bitton, Dignity Aches, supra note 30. 
 77. Wriggins, supra note 70.  Clearly one can think of this criticism from the opposite 
perspective, which says that the existence of lawsuits might encourage the insurance 
companies.  However, the author’s criticism is about the non-adoption of such mandatory 
social insurance for this purpose.  See id. 
 78. I further elaborate on this phenomenon as typical to feminist work in tort law infra, 
Section 2.3. 
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this understanding, an appropriate recourse does not just mean a verdict that 
awards compensation to a female plaintiff; it also involves a decision that 
considers the complexity that sexual assault requires and compensates its 
comprehensive harm. 
The series of Mizrahi cases can be used to exemplify this apprehension 
of sexual assault victime-plaintiffs.79  The event giving rise to the cases 
involved the appalling gang rape of a woman by seven men over the course 
of three days.80  The assault took place in an isolated area, while watchdogs 
stood guard at the entrance to prevent the woman from running away.81  The 
continuous rape was only brought to an end when the rapists discovered the 
woman was suffering from severe and dangerous bleeding.82  Fearing that 
their victim would die from loss of blood, the men transported the woman to 
a nearby hospital, where they left her bleeding outside the emergency room 
entrance.  Upon the culmination of the criminal proceedings with the 
conviction of all predators, the woman sought the assistance of a renowned 
feminist legal non-governmental organization (NGO) to file a tort lawsuit 
against them.83  The lawsuit was thus filed with deliberate use of feminist 
legal language, but the judgment failed nevertheless to reflect this, yielding 
a decision in which tort law remained substantially estranged from typical 
female suffering.  In its short decision, only three paragraphs long, the 
district court ordered the rapists to compensate the plaintiff with a sum of 
460,000 NIS, which represented merely ten percent of the total amount that 
she initially sought.84  The semantic of the judgment was typical of classic 
monetary verdicts; it simply stated that the plaintiff was entitled to be 
compensated for injuries she sustained at the hands of the defendants, as 
estimated by the court.  The unusual facts of the case, as well as any 
recognition that it represented a rare application of tort law, were completely 
absent.  Indeed, the judgment simply dealt with a “plaintiff” and seven 
“defendants,” with “medical costs, pain and suffering,” and nothing more.  
Structure-wise, the decision started with a fairly insipid two-paragraph 
opening, followed by an unanimated third and final paragraph, whereby the 
damage components were enumerated.  It laconically stated: “Therefore, in 
accordance with . . . [statutory Israeli law of procedure] and based on the 
plaintiff’s affidavit, we order: defendants 1-5 will pay the plaintiff, jointly 
and severally, the following amounts.”85  Notwithstanding holding the 
defendants liable, the court awarded 180,000 NIS in relation to the plaintiff’s 
 
 79. CC (Hi) 209/05 Jane Doe v. Mizrahi (Oct. 24, 2006), Nevo Legal Database (by 
subscription) (Isr.). 
 80. CC (Hi) 313/02 State of Israel v. Mizrahi (March 23, 2004) p. 2, Nevo Legal Database 
(by subscription) (Isr.). 
 81. Id. at 3. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 2. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
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pain and suffering, which amounted to less than half the amount she sought 
for this head of damage.86  Most notably, the court completely ignored the 
plaintiff’s invocation of punitive damages, a legal construct designed to 
express the disgust of a civilized society at abhorrent behavior, particularly 
in cases of rape and sexual abuse.87  In sum, the judgment in Mizrahi 
appeared very similar to one that would arise out of a personal injury case 
involving a car accident, medical negligence, or a negligently created hole 
in a sidewalk.88  It was formulated as a payment order of accountability and 
not as an order of responsibility elaborating its socio-legal justifications and 
components.  The judgment served as an important lesson.  In its meager 
framing, it exposed the risk of using tort law to carry out the feminist agenda: 
namely, the risk that the capitalist framework within which tort law functions 
will produce “capitalist decisions.”  The danger is that the court will write a 
verdict that solely concerns a monetary award from the defendant to the 
plaintiff, just like it would do in any other liability suit, in a manner that 
projects no respect to the plaintiff’s suffering and sheds no light on her 
unique situation.  Instead, these cases warrant adapting tort law doctrines to 
the particularities of the feminine experience.  For this reason, the judgment 
was appealed, and the Supreme Court was asked to reconsider its laconic 
nature and low monetary value.89  Accepting the appeal, the Supreme Court 
confirmed that a tort judgment in sexual assault cases should contextualize 
the incident under which it was determined, and the case was remanded to 
the district court for reevaluation.90  Only then was the hoped-for judgment 
given: The district court detailed the facts of the rape, described the ordeal 
of the plaintiff, and, as a result, established significant damages from the 
rape.91  The court awarded 1,325,000 NIS to the plaintiff in damages, with 
the lion’s share of it being of punitive nature.92  Through demonstrating 
awareness of feminist issues central to the case, the new judgment 
exemplified the potential of tort law to raise women’s awareness of their 
right to seek compensation for injuries suffered due to sexual abuse.  Indeed, 
the case has turned into a cornerstone of women’s appeals for compensation 
for sexual abuse.93  
 
 86. CC (Hi) 313/02 State of Israel v. Mizrahi at 2. 
 87. For the special importance of compensation beyond the specific harm of plaintiffs 
victims of sexual assault, see generally Tsachi Keren-Paz, AT v. Dulghieru—Compensation 
for Victims of Trafficking, but Where Is the Restitution?, 18 TORTS L. J. 87 (2010). 
 88. Ironically enough, one might assume that had a car accident been the circumstance in 
which the injury evolved, the verdict would have been more detailed.  
 89. HCJ 10506/06 Jane Doe v. Mizrahi (March 24, 2008), Nevo Legal Database (by 
subscription) (Isr.).   
 90. Id.  Though the court refrained from directly addressing the appeal’s feminist 
contentions, it nevertheless reversed the anti-feminist verdict of the district court.  
 91. CC (Hi) 209/05 Jane Doe v. Mizrahi (May 1, 2008) ¶¶ 4–11, Nevo Legal Database (by 
subscription) (Isr.). 
 92. CC (Hi) 209/05 Jane Doe v. Mizrahi ¶ 12–13. 
 93. In addition to it being used by feminist lawyers in drafting claims, courts, too, cite this 
case for reference.  See, e.g., CC (Hi) 518/07 Jane Doe v. John Doe (May 14, 2009), Nevo 
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Converse examples to the previous case are harder, yet not impossible 
to find.  The case of Jane Doe94 manifests the great potential feminist 
approach holds for women plaintiffs suffering from sexual abuse.  Jane, a 
victim of sex trafficking, filed a suit invoking various innovative legal 
grounds for compensation, including: breach of statutory duty in relation to 
the illegal trafficking; false imprisonment in relation to her forced detention; 
fraud in relation to the manner in which she was deceived into coming to 
Israel for “employment” purposes; and conversion in relation to the funds 
received from clients paying her for sexual intercourse, which her captors 
unlawfully kept.95  The ruling of the district court was saturated with feminist 
accounts.  The court accepted most claims and granted the plaintiff 250,000 
NIS for her non-pecuniary losses and additional 50,000 NIS as punitive 
damages.96  The revolutionary nature of the verdict was not founded upon 
some novel application of tort law,97 but rather in the overtly feminist 
language the court used to reach its decision, which referred in depth to the 
factual and social context under which the transgressions occurred as means 
to better understand the tortious nature of the harm:98 
Human trafficking of people to be used as prostitutes is more serious 
than trafficking of other occupations that are legal, since it is illegal 
and unethical work which treats a woman as a body without a soul, 
whose sole purpose is to satisfy the sexual needs of men, with the 
goal of enriching the trafficker.99 
The clear feminist discourse the court employed was used to impose tort 
liability and award damages to the defendant even under the extreme 
circumstances of the case, in which the plaintiff could not attend a single 
hearing and thus rendered direct proof of her personal harms impossible.100  
 
Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).  The decision is also presented on the websites of the 
Israeli rape crisis center as well as in other feminist nonprofit organizations as an incentive to 
initiate tort proceedings against sexual offenders.  
 94. CC (TA) 2191/02 Jane Doe v. John Doe (Mar. 8, 2006), Nevo Legal Database (by 
subscription) (Isr.). 
 95. Id. at 5. 
 96. The amount related to the plaintiff’s intangible injury alone and was considered a fairly 
high sum, under Israeli standards for such injuries.  
 97. The court accepted the claim on the grounds of breach of statutory duty and false 
imprisonment, while rejecting the ground of conversion, which was derived of the fact that 
the plaintiff had been deprived of funds she made out of her prostitution.  The court held that 
“the plaintiff is not entitled under the framework of this suit to claim conversion as she defined 
it, since it is a disguised claim that is essentially claim for wages.”  Id. at 11.  In Israel, claims 
relating to employment (regrettably, the court related to trafficking as such) are permitted to 
be adjudicated only in labor courts.  Id. at 9.  An interesting question is whether Jane Doe’s 
claim would still have been rejected had she re-conceptualized her claim as unjust enrichment. 
 98. Contextual reading of legal issues is a feminist imperative.  See generally Martha 
Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1597 (1990).  Likewise, its 
importance to rereading tort law is clear.  See Bitton, Foreseeability of Harm, supra note 29. 
 99. CC (Hi) 518/07 Jane Doe v. John Doe at 14. 
 100. Id. at 14–15.  
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The court defended its decision to nevertheless compensate the plaintiff by 
referring to the unique Israeli phenomenon, where trafficked women were 
deported from the country upon the culmination of the criminal trial of their 
traffickers and therefore did not have the opportunity to seek compensation 
for their suffering through a civil suit.101  The concerned judge argued that 
her decision would ensure such plaintiffs could receive the compensation to 
which they were entitled even though they were barred from attending civil 
proceedings pursuant to lengthy criminal proceedings.102  Instead, she 
emphasized that the authority judges have to use their discretion to assess, at 
large, the amount of compensation awarded to the absent victim, using 
information from studies and general findings about the damages female 
victims of sexual violence incur.  The Supreme Court affirmed the verdict, 
despite the tortious difficulties it bore.103 
B. EXPANSIONS OF TORT LAW’S BOUNDARIES BY FEMINIST 
ANALYSIS 
The central influence on tort law that feminist analysis brought about is 
the expansion of the limits of its application.  Feminist analysis was not 
limited to altering tort law’s internal mechanisms’ functions, but also 
reshaped its boundaries by expanding its orbit of protection to include 
women’s suffering as well as other minority groups’ experiences, which 
traditionally fell outside the orbit of the law’s protection.  This section will 
illustrate this process of expansion. 
1. Doctrinal Expansion Into Areas of “New Injustices” 
Unlike the feminist mainstreaming process described above, which 
allowed a “natural” shift inside tort law’s boundaries, the change I will 
describe below occurred against the notion of accepting “mainstream.”  
Indeed, it expanded the recognized boundaries of protection that tort law 
afforded to typical women’s interests, thus demonstrating that the strategic 
wave of feminine-feminist lawsuits washing the shores of courts caused not 
only a practical change, but also a conceptual shift in tort law.  Though this 
change is normally presented in courts’ rhetoric as part of the law’s 
continued comprehensive approach to protect women’s interests, the 
expansion of tort law’s boundaries in actuality is a true innovation, not 
 
 101. CC (Hi) 518/07 Jane Doe v. John Doe at 11–12. 
 102. Id., ¶¶ 13–14.  Under the Israeli legal system, pursuing civil claims only after a verdict 
is rendered in related criminal proceedings is more effective due to certain procedural and 
evidentiary benefits.  These benefits stem from article 77A of the Law of the Courts 
[Consolidated Version], 5744-1984, SH No. 1123 p. 198 (Isr.), which allows the 
administration of a tort claim pursuant to criminal conviction, and article 42A of Evidence 
Law [New Version], 5731-1971, 18 LSI 421 (1971) (Isr.), which allows the use of facts which 
were proven during the criminal sentencing to be admitted for purposes of determining fault 
in the civil proceedings. 
 103. HCJ 3806/06 John Doe v. Jane Doe (May 26, 2009), Nevo Legal Database (by 
subscription) (Isr.).  See particularly ¶ 5. 
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introduced under tort law’s liability regime before.  An illuminating example 
in this area, which began to take root in courts a decade ago, is the tort claims 
of women whose recalcitrant spouses denied them a divorce, and the women 
in turn sued them for compensation.104 
In order to best comprehend the magnitude of this feminist achievement, 
one needs basic familiarization with Israel’s Jewish divorce system.  
Religion exposes a Jewish woman to the risk of suffering from a “recalcitrant 
husband”—a Jewish husband who refuses to release a divorce warrant to his 
wife.  Though facially seeming to be a “religious problem,” this phenomenon 
is particularly acute and distinctively “legal” since, in Israel, Jewish tradition 
is closely intertwined with otherwise generally secular state laws, in a 
manner quintessential to a mixed, religious-secular legal system.105  Israeli 
family law prescribes the application of ancient Jewish law on Israeli Jews 
by religious courts, thereby subjecting women to discriminatory religious 
practices.  Particularly harmful is the inequality of Jewish divorce law, where 
completion of divorce proceedings is uniquely conditional upon the 
husband’s agreement to give his wife a writ.  Husbands often use this unequal 
disposition to exploit their power to extort financial and custodial 
concessions from their wives during divorce discussions or to simply prevent 
the wife from remarrying.  A tortious perspective on these circumstances 
offers a platform for compelling the man to pay for not granting the writ 
based on the unreasonable manner of his refusal.106  
The claims of women denied a divorce relied on both existing legislation 
and case law in the realm of the right to autonomy, and therefore may be 
interpreted as a natural development thereof.  In the context of the 
abridgement of individual autonomy, lower courts have used the liability 
standard the supreme court first imposed in the case of Da’aka v. Carmel 
Hospital107 as strong conceptual support of women who are refused a divorce 
 
 104. See the following seminal judgments on this issue: CC (Jer) 3950/00 Jane Doe v. John 
Doe (2001), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.); CC (Jer) 19270/03 K.S. v. K.P. 
(2004), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.); and CC (Kfar-Saba) 19480/05 Jane Doe 
v. Estate of John Doe (2006), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.). 
 105. The secular Israeli legal system has incorporated Jewish law as mandating marriage 
and divorce of Israeli Jews, granting sole jurisdiction over these matters to the state rabbinical 
courts and subject to the religious Jewish rulings.  Rabbinical Court Law (Marriage and 
Divorce), 5713-1953, 7 LSI 139 (1953–1954) (Isr.). 
 106. See generally Benjamin Shmueli, Civil Actions for Acts that Are Valid According to 
Religious Family Law but Harm Women’s Rights: Legal Pluralism in Cases of Collision 
Between Two Sets of Laws, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 823 (2013); Pascale Fournier, Pascal 
McDougall & Merissa Lichtsztral, Secular Rights and Religious Wrongs? Family Law, 
Religion and Women in Israel, 18 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 333 (2012). 
 107. HCJ 2781/93 Da’aka v. Carmel Hospital 53(4) PD 526 [1999] (Isr.).  However useful 
at first glance, the reliance on Da’aka as authority for awarding damages to women who are 
being denied a divorce, is limited.  In Da’aka, the compensation was awarded for injury to 
the plaintiff’s autonomy, which reflected a symbolic rather than actual consequential damage 
sustained, by her.  Id. at 573–77.  Similarly, women being denied a divorce are in the same 
position, since they do suffer actual consequential damage upon their partners’ refusal to grant 
them a divorce.  Tsachi Keren-Paz, for instance, argues that invoking Da’aka may reduce the 
YIFAT (DO NOT DELETE) 4/3/2014  5:11 PM 
244 HASTINGS WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25:2 
writ, as it affirms the individual’s right to autonomy she was denied with 
regards to whether or not to be married.  Legal counts such as breach of 
statutory duty and negligence were joined together to form the basis of this 
tort entitlement.108  Courts identified refusal of a husband to warrant a 
divorce writ as constituting a civil wrong, since it violates a woman’s 
autonomy, inhibits her ability to determine issues central to her future, and 
prevents her from fulfilling her existence as a free individual.109  In doing so, 
courts constrained the boundaries of male dominance that is permitted under 
the auspices of religious law, and de-legitimized this dominance over women 
by providing the latter with recourse for its harmful consequences in the civil 
system.  Interestingly, the issue of women who are refused a divorce writ has 
been already brought before the supreme court under a tort claim almost two 
decades prior to the current claims outbreak: the case of Sohan110 considered 
the harm inflicted upon a woman whose recalcitrant husband managed to 
escape Israel due to the negligence of Israeli Immigration Police, and left her 
forever trapped in an unwanted marriage.111  Notwithstanding its tight 
relation to feminine life experience, Sohan, however, was not adjudicated 
upon any such context, and had no authority over cases of similarly situated 
women who won their tort claims.  Moreover, it took potential plaintiffs, as 
well as courts, one-and-a-half decades to consider this oppressive gender-
based practice as having compensatory implications.  However, the recent 
court rulings on this matter indicate an open and clear willingness to 
recognize women’s suffering in this situation as intolerable and act to end it.  
Women also react accordingly by filing more and more of these lawsuits and 
thus putting more trust in the courts.   
Two Israeli feminist analysts, Tsachi Keren-Paz and Naomi Levenkron, 
recently developed another paradigm for commonplace wrongs to apply to 
defend “newly recognized” women’s suffering.  The pair recommended 
imposing strict liability on customers of brothels for the sexual services they 
purchase from women in the sex trafficking industry.112  Keren-Paz and 
Levenkron’s position is based on the re-conceptualization of the element of 
 
amount of compensation granted to women who are denied a divorce and undermine the 
overarching goal of affording them redress.  See generally Tsachi Keren-Paz, Compensation 
for Infringement of Autonomy: A Normative Assessment, Current Developments and Future 
Trends, 11 HAMISHPAT 187 (2007) (Hebrew). 
 108. CC (Jer) 3950/00 Jane Doe v. John Doe (Jan. 23, 2001) 34, Nevo Legal Database (by 
subscription) (Isr.).  In this sense, the court clarified that even after a divorce had already been 
granted, this does not prevent the woman from seeking compensation for past damages she 
incurred while she was being denied it.  Id. at 37.  
 109. To this end the court relies on various sources such as Jewish ancient law and family 
law rules. 
 110. HCJ 429/82 State of Israel v. Sohan 42(3) PD 733 [1988] (Isr.).  For a detailed analysis 
of the judgment in Sohan and whether it constitutes an apt analysis for cases of divorce-denied 
women, see Bitton, Power Relations, supra note 32, at 174–76. 
 111. HCJ 429/82 State of Israel v. Sohan 42(3) PD, at 734.  
 112. See generally Tsachi Keren-Paz & Nomi Levenkron, Clients’ Strict Liability Towards 
Victims of Sex-Trafficking, 29 LEGAL STUD. 438 (2009). 
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consent in the tort of assault within the context of sex trafficking, and attests 
to the lack of agreement, either real or constructive, in these 
circumstances.113  In another article, Keren-Paz proposed treating 
“customers’” use of women's bodies in brothels as a tort of conversion.114  
His innovative argument is that women have a right to not be objectified, 
which is part of their property right over their own bodies.115  This right is 
abridged each time a customer commits sexual acts with a prostitute, who is 
held to lack true consent for selling her body, in a manner satisfying the 
components of the tort of conversion.116  These important theoretical and 
doctrinal developments, though yet to be implemented in practice, lay the 
infrastructure required to realizing the full potential embedded in current 
Israeli tort law to recognize new “injustices” through reviving traditional and 
neglected wrongs, and extend tort law’s protection to women who need it. 
2. Expanding the Categories of Protection to Other Disadvantaged 
Groups  
An important and systemic virtue of feminist analysis is its applicability 
for the betterment of other minority groups.  Indeed, feminist theory does not 
limit itself to women or women's issues; one of its strengths lies in its broad 
conceptual critique of inequality, which can be used as a basis for any 
minority group suffering from social subordination.117  This diverse 
application of feminist analysis is what brought it prominence and 
distinctiveness in the legal discourse.118  
The diverse applications of feminist analysis, which are evident in tort 
law as well, demonstrate its importance.  An example of this trait is, again, 
the Sexual Harassment Prevention Act.  While most sexual harassment is 
targeted at women, the law does not neglect forms of sexual harassment 
members of other minority communities suffer.  The LGBT population, 
known for being often harassed for its members’ sexual lifestyle, is also 
entitled to direct protection under the Act’s Article III, which prohibits 
sexual harassment based on “sexual orientation.”119  Moreover, people 
whose sexual orientation is heterosexual, but whose sexual identity is 
ambiguous or subject to change, are also protected by the Act.120  It is 
interesting to observe how the protection of the LGBT community pursuant 
to feminist struggles expanded to other areas as well.  Pursuant to its 
 
 113. Levenkron, supra note 112, at 438–39. 
 114. See generally Tsachi Keren-Paz, Poetic Justice: Why Sex-Slaves Should Be Allowed to 
Sue Ignorant Clients in Conversion, 29 L. & PHIL. 307 (2010). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Bitton, Power Relations, supra note 32, at 150–52. 
 118. See Fiss, supra note 22.  Fiss advocates the importance of feminist theory.  
 119. Sexual Harassment Prevention Act, 5748-1998, SH No. 1661 p. 166 (Isr.), article 3(5). 
 120. Id.  Additional to protecting against sexual harassment based on “sexual orientation,” 
article 3(5) provides protection against “degrading or humiliating behavior towards a person” 
based on his/her “sexuality.”  
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protection under the Sexual Harassment Prevention Act, the LGBT 
community obtained further social shield—this time against defamation—
under the Israeli Defamation Law.121  
In another progressive move, courts turned the tools developed through 
feminist analysis to combat gender-based inequalities into means to protect 
male plaintiffs.122  In a recent ruling, the court awarded compensation to a 
man whose wife refused to give him a divorce writ.  This phenomenon—
which I consider problematic when occurring outside the context of gender-
based power relations—further indicates the importance of using tort law to 
provide qualitative protection to the rights of both men and women, 
whenever they become victims of gender power relations.123 
3. Expanding Protection Patterns of Negligence Law 
 
 121. Defamation Act, 5725-1965, SH No. 464 p. 240 (Isr.), article 1.  The original 
defamation statute did not include a prohibition against degrading a person on grounds of their 
“sexual orientation,” and only on February 28, 1997, did the Knesset pass an amendment 
which defined libel as any publication which is likely to “degrade a person based on race, 
national origin, religion, place of residence, gender, or sexual orientation.”  Id. (emphasis 
added).  Regardless of its clear benefit, criticism has been raised against the application of 
this tort by courts as a means to reinforce homosexual identity as shaming and degrading.  See 
generally Heddy Vitarbo, Heterosexuality crisis: Constructing Sexual Identity in the Laws of 
Libel 33 IYUNEY MISHPAT 5 (2010) (Hebrew). 
 122. CC (Jer) 21162/07 John Doe v. Jane Doe (2010), Nevo Legal Database (by 
subscription) (Isr.). 
 123. It is my position that tort law is intended to protect all people who suffer from 
unacceptable social phenomena, and in this case, a phenomenon originating from gender 
power relations.  At the same time, it is important that such use of tort law take into account 
the unique facts of the case, in light of the general social power relations under which they 
are evaluated.  For example, in John Doe, the judge makes it clear that the woman exercised 
her power not to grant her husband a divorce due to his repudiation of her economic rights in 
the Rabbinical Court.  Id.  If this is the case, then it is questionable whether the woman’s 
behavior was unreasonable and negligent in trying to alleviate the harm incurred by her in the 
Rabbinical Court.  These considerations can also affect her right to argue exemption of 
liability based on defenses like assumption of risk or contributory negligence on her husband’s 
part.  The court’s abstention from discussing the woman’s claim in depth on the one hand, 
and his disregard for the fact that the husband was issued unique Rabbinical permission (also 
known as “permission of 100 Rabbis”) to remarry against his wife’s will on the other, are very 
disturbing, and seem to misuse the feminist theory upon which this unique claim was 
developed.  Moreover, given the obvious disparity in gender power relations and the different 
harms resulting in cases where it is the woman who refuses to grant a divorce to the man, it 
would be appropriate for the court to take these dissimilarities into account when assessing 
the harm incurred by the plaintiff.  For example, a man being refused a divorce may be 
permitted to wed another woman despite his reluctant partner (as was shown in this case), 
whereas a woman remains married for life and suffers the serious consequences, both from a 
legal and a social perspective.  This phenomenon and its hideousness has been repeatedly 
discussed by the Supreme Court.  See, e.g., HCJ 6751/04 Sabag v. Great Rabbinical Court of 
Appeals 59(4) PD 817 [2004] (Isr.); HCJ 2123/08 John Doe v. Jane Doe 62(4) PD 1, 13–17 
[2008] (Isr.).  For further critique, see generally A. Strum, Jewish Divorce: What Can the 
Civil Courts Do?, 7 AUST. J. OF FAM. L. 225 (1993); Barbara J. Redman, Jewish Divorce: 
What Can Be Done in Secular Courts to Aid the Jewish Woman?, 19 GA. L. REV. 389 (1985). 
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A notable aspect of the tort of negligence is the flexibility of its elements, 
used as a basis to expand or constrain its scope of application.124  The “duty” 
element is traditionally considered the primary outlet for expressive policy 
considerations dictating the scope of negligence law.  Indeed, it was through 
the use of this element that common law courts objected to the expansion of 
tort liability to include peripheral tortfeasors.125  A peripheral tortfeasor, in 
contrast to a direct tortfeasor, is one whose contribution to the harm is 
indirect and collateral and who is therefore neither the direct nor the primary 
cause of the damage.  Though tort law recognizes peripheral tortfeasors in 
principle, traditionally the courts have expressed strong preference for 
imposing liability on direct tortfeasors.126  This predisposition has had a 
harmful impact on women as their lives are carried out within the framework 
of power relations, thereby rendering them more vulnerable to two 
systematic risks.127  The first is the risk of sustaining direct injury caused by 
a tortfeasor who bears power surplus over the woman.  The second risk is 
that of getting injured from the direct implications of the gendered power 
relations as a consequence of a peripheral party’s act or omission which 
facilitates the direct harmful act or extends its duration or magnitude.128  
Though entailed by a systematic framework of power relations, the latter risk 
is nevertheless indirect and therefore defined as peripheral under tort law.129  
This distinction can be illustrated with two examples pertaining to typical 
feminine life experiences.  The first example concerns the case of “N,” who 
was four years old when she was first sent to the municipal social services 
for psychological assessment, after her kindergarten teacher suspected that 
the child had been molested at home.130  Indeed, the psychologist who 
evaluated the child’s condition defined her behavior as indicative of 
“pathological patterns of sexual behavior [performed] by her father.”131  
Despite this alarming observation, the municipal authorities neglected to 
 
 124. Dilan A. Esper & Gregory C. Keating, Abusing “Duty,” 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 265, 270–
72 (2006) (for U.S. tort law); Israel Gilead, The Foundations of the Negligence Tort in Israeli 
Law, 14 IYUNEY MISHPAT 319, 328, 338 (1988) (Hebrew) (for Israeli tort law). 
 125. See generally Jane Stapleton, Duty of Care and Economic Loss: A Wider Agenda, 107 
LAW Q. REV. 249 (1991).  
 126. The notion of peripheral liability is introduced by Jane Stapleton, in her chapter In 
Restraint of Tort, in 2 THE FRONTIERS OF LIABILITY 83, 85 (Peter Birks ed., 1994).  The writ 
system—which died, but haunts us from the grave, as the famous tort idiom states—has direct 
bearing on tort law analysis’ reluctance to recognize indirect causes of harm as liable to it.  
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, TORT LIABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES 27–29, 37–53 (2008). 
 127. See Bitton, Power Relations, supra note 32, at 172–79. 
 128. A prominent example of such facilitation would be the police, neglecting to protect a 
woman from a man who threatens to harm her.  See Bitton, Power Relations, supra note 32, 
at 177–79. 
 129. Bitton, Power Relations, supra note 32, at 172–79. 
 130. The facts presented here are taken from the case of 4867/99 Jane Doe v. The Ministry 
of Social Welfare (2010) (Isr.) (unpublished). The case, where the author represented the 
plaintiff, was settled outside the court in 2010. 
 131. Id. 
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react professionally, and decided to abort N’s case.132  Eight long years later, 
when N was hospitalized following her first suicide attempt, her medical 
team became aware of the sexual abuse she suffered at the hands of her father 
and reported it to the police.133  The police opened an investigation but closed 
it soon after, citing “lack of cooperation” by N’s family as the reason for its 
intransigent act.  It took four more years and several other suicide attempts 
for the police to reinstate the investigation, which revealed that N’s father 
sexually molested her throughout her entire life.134  He was eventually 
convicted of sexual assault.135  The father in this case was the direct injurious 
perpetrator who exploited the gender-power relationship between him and 
his daughter through the mechanism of incest.  By failing to act on N’s 
behalf, the municipal entities and police officers neglected their duty to 
identify the catastrophe and allowed it to linger, thereby demonstrating 
systematic failure to protect females against the risks social gendered power 
relations inflict upon them.  In N’s case, establishing a viable tort claim 
against her father as a direct tortfeasor is simple.  However, the efficacy of 
such a claim is limited.  Secondary to a criminal ban on incest, civil claims 
brought against molesting fathers bear only moderate effect on abolishing 
the phenomenon altogether.  Ironically, while the imposition of tort liability 
on public bodies will likely have significant aptitude to prevent, or at least 
reduce, the magnitude of the phenomenon, such liability is substantially 
more difficult to impose under negligence law.136  Extending liability to 
peripheral tortfeasors is thus a project of crucial importance to feminist 
analysis of tort law.  
The notion of establishing “social” and more peripheral liability to 
protect women against the harms befalling them is not limited to government 
entities.  Due to the capitalist nature of society, companies pervade the public 
area of life, and the classic liberal account they hold as private entities does 
not shield them from liability that carries public meaning.  Demonstrative of 
this understanding is the recent case of Beitili,137 whereby the court imposed 
liability on the privately owned company Beitili, a successful chain of home 
design stores, to compensate the estate of Tamar Brez, a woman who was 
raped and murdered in 1997 on the roof of Beitili’s flagship store’s 
premises.138  Tamar went to the shop in search of home furniture.139 There, 
 
 132. 4867/99 Jane Doe v. The Ministry of Social Welfare. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. CC (Hi) 319/99 People v. Shwartz, (Jan. 29, 2001) (unpublished) (Isr.).  Outrageously, 
the father was sentenced, in a plea bargain, to two years imprisonment, out of which one year 
was on parole.  Id., ¶ 4.  
 136. The reasons for this difficulty are elaborated in Bitton, Liability of Bias, supra note 3, 
at 83–85. 
 137. CC (TA) 2271/04 Brez v. Beitili Ltd., (Apr. 7, 2010), Nevo Legal Database (by 
subscription) (Isr.). 
 138. Id. at 3. 
 139. Id. 
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store personnel directed her to the top-floor display, which was an isolated 
area of the store.140  Confident in the safety inherent in every business 
premise that welcomes the public with a security guard at its entrance, Tamar 
went up to the top floor.141  However, upon her arrival, an employee who had 
been lurking behind her attacked her and locked the door to the floor behind 
her.142  Undisturbed, he implemented a sadistic, premeditated plan of rape 
and murder.143  Note that Tamar’s rape and murder occurred because she was 
a woman.  It is also noteworthy that the perpetrator pursued his crime after 
having searched for months for a site suitable for his vicious plan, as was 
eventually evident in his own testimony.144  The plaintiff claimed Beitili, 
whose main priority as a company was generating fiscal profit, did not create 
a safe purchasing environment for women, who constitute its lion share of 
consumers.145  This outrageous neglect of the company's role to ensure a safe 
environment for women resonates with the commonly held perception that 
women alone are required to limit their personal freedom and quality of life 
in order to reduce their risk of becoming victims of male sexual attack.  
Paradoxically, although society burdens women with vulnerability to risks 
due to gender power relations, it is nevertheless women’s responsibility 
alone to shield themselves against the dangers imposed on them by 
society.146 
The district court refurnished the “duty” concept to counter this 
offensive cultural perception.  The court’s position was that the business 
owners’ category of liability should be expanded to include safety concerns 
of customers, incentivizing business owners to invest in security measures 
for shoppers.  Although couched in gender-neutral terms, the verdict had far-
reaching implications for women.  It utilized tort law to shift the 
responsibility that women have traditionally assumed to ensure their own 
safety—with which they were burdened due to structural gender power 
relations—to society as a whole.  The judgment revolved around this axis of 
business owners’ responsibility to prevent the risk of creating “secluded 
spaces” in business premises, thereby reinforcing the case’s gender 
significance, since women alone incur the additional risk of being raped in 
these secluded spaces. 
 
 140. CC (TA) 2271/04 Brez v. Beitili Ltd. at 4. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 4–5. 
 144. Id. at 10. 
 145. CC (TA) 2271/04 Brez v. Beitili Ltd., 23–26, 35 (Apr. 7, 2010), Nevo Legal Database 
(by subscription) (Isr.). 
 146. Beyond shouldering the costs of rape itself, women also incur the costs of preventing 
it.  More to the point, they are put in a contradictory condition, in which they are taught to 
fear men and at the same time expected to rely on them for protection from other men.  ESTHER 
MADRIZ, NOTHING BAD HAPPENS TO GOOD GIRLS: FEAR OF CRIME IN WOMEN’S LIVES 1–2 
(1997). 
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The radiating effect this ruling has on the safety of women as a whole 
stems not only from the foregoing contentions but also from the case’s far-
reaching influence.  Though the verdict was directed against the specific 
defendant company, it directly impacted insurance companies across the 
national business market provide insurance for on-the-premises damages.  
The court’s liability insurance paradigm increases the efficacy of the concept 
of changing social burdens and responsibilities in relation to injuries women 
incur.  In order to protect their financial interests, insurance companies, 
under an assumption of simple rational economic calculus, will likely change 
their safety requirements for business premises as prerequisites for issuing 
insurance policies.147  These requirements will change personal safety-
assuring patterns of businesses in Israel, and accordingly, influence the 
allocation of responsibility for women’s safety.  As such, it may substantially 
enhance the tort-driven social change initiative introduced by feminist critics 
of tort law. 
Despite its celebrated traits, it is important to note that the verdict’s 
rhetoric did not contain innovative interpretations of tort law, but rather 
employed conventional analysis.  It thus demonstrated that the power to 
impose liability on peripheral tortfeasors—which bears significant value for 
identifying entities that facilitate systematic materialization of potential 
social vulnerability—is embedded in tort law.  Here lies the significance of 
the case in terms of internal tort law: It demonstrates that tort law is suitable 
for modern social systems under which the evolution of damage may reach 
far beyond the injured party and the direct tortfeasor, where neither one even 
knows of the other’s existence.148  Applying this notion to Beitili, it can be 
 
 147. In Beitili, the insurance company was one of Israel’s most prominent companies, 
Migdal Group, which occupies the largest share of the market and insures the majority of 
private businesses’ premises in Israel.  CC (TA) 2271/04 Brez v. Beitili Ltd. 
 148. In Israel, the idea of immunity that absolves the state of tort liability has long been 
rejected.  Civil Torts Act (Liability of the State), 5712-1952, SH No. 109 p. 339 (Isr.).  
Reinforced by HCJ 243/83 Jerusalem Municipality v. Gordon, 39(1) PD 113, 134 [1985] 
(Isr.).  In practice, Israeli courts are substantially more liberal with respect to imposing 
liability on governmental entities than their Anglo-American counterparts.  See, e.g., HCJ 
145/80 Vaknin v. Municipal Council, Beit Shemesh, 37(1) PD 113, 122 [1982] (Isr.).  In 
contrast, in England in a case with similar circumstances, Tomlinson v. Congleton Borough 
Council, [2003] 3 WLR 705 (Eng.), the court indeed recognized a duty of care, but on appeal, 
the House of Lords reversed, stating that no duty of care lies between the city council and the 
city’s residents.  See Tomlinson v. Congleton Borough Council, [2004] 1 A.C. 46 (H.L.) 
(Eng.).  Another example is the case of Sohan, where Sohan filed a lawsuit against the police 
for negligent failure to prevent her husband from leaving the country, due to which she 
remained an agunah (a woman bound in marriage under religious law to a husband who 
refuses to grant a divorce).  HCJ 429/82 State of Israel v. Sohan 42(3) PD 733 [1988] (Isr.).  
Her claim was accepted, and the Supreme Court held that the police owe a duty of care to the 
public.  Sohan is surely considered by common law tort law to be a legal mistake or at least, 
an exception to the common rule.  The trend in quite a few English courts is to reduce the 
liability of public servants working under governmental power.  See Curran v. Northern 
Ireland Co-ownership Housing Association Ltd., [1987] A.C. 718, [2 WLR].L. 1043 (N. Ir.); 
Hill v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire, [1987] 1 All ER 1173 (Can.).  In American law, 
this has long been the case, even in tremendously horrendous circumstances.  See Riss v. City 
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argued that the day the business space of Beitili was designed, minimal 
security arrangements were made.  Long before it opened its doors to the 
public, Tamar's Berez's rape and murder was determined.  Tort law takes us 
to this preliminary point in the planning phase to identify the determination 
of Tamar’s fate as an injustice. 
The abovementioned cases are demonstrative of a larger trend of 
feminist influence over the boundaries of tort law’s protection.  Judgments 
that addressed feminine life experiences reshaped these boundaries as well 
as tort law’s most fundamental concepts.  For example, the elements of 
reasonability, foreseeability, and the causal nexus within negligence law 
were reconsidered in a case in which a woman committed suicide after 
enduring continuous suffering at the hands of a violent spouse, whose claim 
for breach of the causal chain due to his wife’s “voluntary” killing was 
declined by the Court.149  Another judgment, which compensated a victim of 
sex trafficking, led to a better understanding of the authority a criminal 
conviction of the defendant should have on the onus of the plaintiff’s 
satisfaction of tort liability elements, and contributed to the development of 
the principle of compensation without proof of damage.150  Principles that 
had been lost in the recesses of tort history, such as providing aggravated 
damages,151 were resurrected as significant compensatory tools for intangible 
harms in cases of women being denied a divorce and female victims of 
sexual abuse.152  Feminist analysis of a case that awarded compensation to a 
woman whose partner refused to divorce her and was able to flee abroad as 
a consequence of police negligence demonstrated how the overexpansion of 
state liability—which was implemented in this case—can be narrowed by 
using a nuanced reading of the case relevant to women suffering from 
gender-based abuse.153  Disempowered women like Huria Sultan, a 
 
of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860 (1968); Cuffy v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 
255, 505 N.E.2d. 937 (1987).  Chief Justice Barak was well aware of the progressive stance 
of his ruling, stating: “It is well known that in matters of negligence this court precedes 
English case law.”  HCJ 429/82 State of Israel v. Sohan 42(3) PD at 742. 
 149. HCJ 7832/00 Yaakobov v. The State of Israel, 56(2) PD 534 [2002] (Isr.). The 
transformative analysis provided by the Court in this case is presented in Bitton, Dignity 
Aches, supra note 30, at 177–79. 
 150. CC (Hi) 209/05 Jane Doe v. Mizrahi (May 1, 2008), Nevo Legal Database (by 
subscription) (Isr.). 
 151. Aggravated damages are intended to express an honest assessment of the damage 
caused, and are awarded in cases where the damage was intensified following reprehensible 
behavior of the tortfeasor.  GAD TEDESCHI, THE LAW OF CIVIL WRONGS: THE GENERAL PART, 
579 (Hebrew University Press, 1976); DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES (2d ed. 1973).  These 
damages function to provide the primary application of the principle of restitutio in intgrum, 
as opposed to the punishing effect intended by punitive damages which are an exception to 
this principle.  Yehuda Adar, Touring the Punitive Damages Forest: A Proposed Roadmap, 
1 OSSERVATORIO DI DIRITTO CIVILE E COMMERCIALE [The Civil & Commercial Law 
Observer] 275, 317 (2012). 
 152. CC (Jer) 2160/99 L. v. L. (Aug. 31, 2005), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) 
(Isr.). 
 153. Bitton, supra note 32, at 176. 
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Palestinian woman who sought compensation for the divorce her husband 
carried out against her will, expanded the breach of statutory duty boundaries 
to include criminal offenses that are designed to regulate social conduct as a 
whole, as a means to protect a single woman from her husband’s injurious 
coercion.154  A man whose sexual competence was harmed in a car accident 
yielded the Court’s first questioning as to the sanctity of the restitutio in 
integrum principle perceived to be the underlying pillar of common law 
torts.155  At this stage, it is sufficient to pinpoint these cases as signifying the 
great potential embedded in feminist analysis of tort law to question tort 
law’s traditional boundaries and introduce new tools for resetting the 
boundaries to accommodate the changing modern, as well as liberal, needs 
of society. 
C. RESHAPING TORT’S PROCEDURES   
The introduction of feminist discourse into the substantive boundaries of 
tort law required a corresponding development in its procedural boundaries, 
as is customary with the relationship between legal form and substance.  As 
with any legal-ideological revolution, the change in tort law was subject to a 
constant risk.  Though it recognized an entitlement to compensation pursuant 
to feminine injuries, procedural elements inhibited the implementation of 
such entitlement.  These difficulties and their corresponding solutions, which 
were achieved through feminist analysis, will be illustrated using two 
examples in the following paragraphs.  The first example relates to 
determining the amount of court fees women plaintiffs owe when filing a 
lawsuit for compensation in sexual abuse cases, and the second relates to the 
Statute of Limitations effective in these cases.156 
1. Determining Court Fees for Personal Injury Suit Arising Pursuant 
to Sexual Assault 
Despite the rapid recognition of women’s claims, only women who have 
access to significant funds, or those that enjoy pro-bono representation are 
able to file lawsuits and manage a trial, primarily due to the mandatory fee 
arrangement of the Israeli system, which requires court fee for filing any 
lawsuit.  This arrangement determines the amount of the fee as 
proportionately derived of the amount of the claim filed, and thus serves as 
a disincentive to file claims for significant sums of money.157  Invoking the 
economic-status exemption for this fee hardly solves this difficulty. The 
 
 154. HCJ 245/81 Sultan v. Sultan, 38(3) PD 169 [1984] (Isr.). 
 155. HCJ 11152/04 Pedro v. Migdal Insurance Ltd. 61(3) PD 310 [2006] (Isr.). 
 156. Though each of these two issues warrants extensive analysis, due to space constraints, 
reference to them will be brief and will mainly seek to present the potential development that 
arises from them. 
 157. Generally, court fees amount to 2.5% of the total sum sought by the plaintiff for 
compensation, as stipulated in article 6 of the Court Regulations (Fees), 2007, KT 6579, 720 
(Isr.). 
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waiver’s highly restrictive criteria and the state's draconian demands to 
provide extensive evidence of the plaintiff's financial situation sometimes 
leads to utter despair and abandonment of the claim.158  A more prudent route 
for avoiding the fee calculus as a proportion of the sum claimed is instead 
invoking a very low, flat fee designed for personal injury claims.159  This 
format is set to allow better access to those whom the tort framework is 
intended most to protect—plaintiffs who have incurred bodily injury.160 
Therefore, a key tool in providing victims of sexual assault with access 
to tort law is ensuring their claims remain under the category of “personal 
injury.” Ostensibly, this should not pose a challenge, since their damage is 
clearly bodily damage.  However, with the growing number of compensation 
claims filed in courts, the Israeli Justice Ministry attempted to undermine 
this basic understanding.  In a recent court case, the plaintiff, a victim of 
sexual assault, was required by the state to pay extremely high court fees 
after classifying parts of her claim’s head of damages as non-bodily, namely, 
components such as punitive damages and harm to her autonomy.161 
Alternatively, the state advised the plaintiff to withdraw these heads of 
damages and regain her flat fee eligibility.162  The state’s decision to 
reclassify the suit was based on a former ruling, given by the Supreme Court, 
in which it was held that a claim pursuant to false imprisonment of the 
plaintiff should not be categorized as “personal injury” as long as it pertains 
to the plaintiff’s non-pecuniary heads of damage.163  The sexually assaulted 
plaintiff’s contention against this stance was that any harm originated from 
the bodily injury she incurred, and any compensation resulting from this act 
against her body, fits in the category of “personal injury”, as a matter of 
analytical logic.164  Moreover, her suggested interpretation better adheres to 
the rationale underlying the purpose of the flat fee arrangement to ease access 
 
 158. Based on my extensive experience with fee waiver processes, in rough evaluation, the 
prevalent average duration of this preliminary stage is no less than six months. 
 159. See the latest update to the monetary charge in article 5 to the regulations.  Id.  Note 
that this arrangement does not apply to the family court, and a woman who wants to sue her 
husband has to pay a fee according to article 1 of the First Appendix to the Family Court 
Regulation on Court Fees, 1995, KT 1293 8 (Isr.), in the amount of 1% of the sum sought in 
the suit, even if it is in relation to personal injury.  For further details, see HCJ 5027/09 Jane 
Doe v. Department of Justice [June 2, 2010] Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.). 
 160. The importance of utilizing tort law to protect first and foremost against bodily harm 
is acknowledged by one of this field’s harshest critics.  See generally Richard L. Abel, Should 
Tort Law Protect Property Against Accidental Loss?, 23 SAN DIEGO. L. REV. 79 (1986).  
 161. CC (PT) 72/08 Raz v. Ministry of Education (Nov. 12, 2008), Nevo Legal Database 
(by subscription) (Isr.), ¶ 3. 
 162. Id., ¶ 7. 
 163. See HCJ 5237/06 State of Israel - Courts Administration v. Mansour [July 6, 2008], 
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).  In brief, I will point out my mind does not rest 
easy with the court’s decision in this case.  As a matter of principle, the distinctions made by 
the court between different types of damages seem artificial and difficult to implement. 
 164. CC (PT) 72/08 Raz v. Ministry of Education (Nov. 12, 2008), Nevo Legal Database 
(by subscription) (Isr.), ¶ 3. 
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to justice for those whose suffering is severe, immediate, and clear.165  The 
Magistrates’ Court accepted the state’s arguments at first, but following an 
appeal, the decision was reversed, with the higher judge maintaining that the 
damages sought by the plaintiff all resulted from her physical injuries, as it 
was the sexual attack over her body that generated them.166  The district 
court, which presided over the state’s additional appeal, affirmed and used 
its judgment to express indignation about the state’s position on the matter 
and its persistent representatives who “stood in the way of the respondent 
and tried to block her entrance through the doors of the court.”167  Aside from 
its practical importance, the wide scope of this decision—keeping the doors 
of tort law open to victims of sexual assault everywhere—demonstrates the 
epistemological importance of recognizing their injury as bodily.  With its 
decision, the court proved it was parting ways from traditional tort doctrines, 
which afforded less protection to tangible harms, judging them as subjective 
and therefore difficult to prove and to understand.  Instead, this case 
conferred female victims of sexual attacks, who sustain many tangible 
harms, with the status of victims of bodily harm. This status is most favorable 
under tort law and afforded its utmost protection.168  This “alignment” of 
injuries has dual significance: it not only formally establishes that sexual 
assault-induced injuries are typical to female life-experience but are 
nevertheless recognized under tort law, but also seeks to provide full and 
effective protection against these harms.  
2. Statute of limitations for claims pursuant to domestic violence 
According to articles 5 and 6 of the Israeli Statute of Limitations Act, 
1958, a tort claim must be filed within seven years of the date of the tortious 
act resulting in the injury.  Article 13 prolongs this period in the case of 
spousal claims until a divorce has been finalized.169  However, many female 
victims of domestic violence find themselves in a state of mental exhaustion 
following a lifetime of violent terror, and normally, also a battle over the 
divorce, and are only able to confront their suffering and trauma years later.  
As such, these women can pass the seven-year threshold set by the law 
without acquiring sufficient mental resources to bring a tort claim against 
 
 165. Purposeful interpretation is highly prevalent in Israeli jurisprudence and is most 
associated with former Chief Justice Barak.  See AHARON BARAK, PURPOSIVE 
INTERPRETATION IN LAW 129–139 (Princeton University Press, 2005); AHARON BARAK, THE 
JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY 125–152 (Princeton University Press, 2008). 
 166. CC (PT) 72/08 Raz v. Ministry of Education (Nov. 12, 2008), Nevo Legal Database 
(by subscription) (Isr.). 
 167. AC (CD) 14624-12/08 Ministry of Education v. Doe (Dec. 28, 2008), Nevo Legal 
Database (by subscription) (Isr.). 
 168. Unsatisfactory compensation for sexual assaults has long been a challenge for tort 
adjudication.  See Kate Sutherland, Measuring Pain: Quantifying Damages in Civil Suits for 
Sexual Assault, in TORT THEORY 212, 216–25 (Ken Cooper-Stephenson & Elaine Gibson eds., 
1993). This difficulty can be seen as part of a more systematic rejection of the notion of 
ethereal interests in tort law.  Levit, supra note 23, at 140–42.  
 169. Statute of Limitations Act, 5718-1958, SH No. 251 p. 112 (Isr.). 
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their divorcee.170  Indeed, it is widely understood that the reason why so few 
suits of this kind are filed is because it is assumed that they have expired.  
Such was the case of D, who lived for years with an abusive, sadistic spouse, 
and fell into a deep depression while she was with him.171   She was unable 
to move forward from her experiences until years after their divorce when 
she decided to try and build her life anew.172  As a first step, D went to a 
psychologist.  During treatment she began to process that she was a victim 
of deliberate abuse, and, following this insight, filed a claim against her 
divorcee for the years of suffering he caused her and the harms she befell.  
The defendant soon filed a motion to dismiss the case on the grounds that 
the claim had already expired and therefore should be barred.  However, the 
court decided to establish a precedent that recognized the unique situation of 
women living with an abusive partner, and upheld the suspension of the 
statute of limitations on the basis that D had previously not been cognizant 
of her potential cause of action.173  The court considered the date on which 
D internalized the fact that she was being abused—which happened during 
psychological treatment—as the date on which she obtained knowledge of 
the facts that constituted a cause of action.174  To this end, the court agreed 
to acknowledge that D developed a mechanism of psychological repression 
during her marriage, which affected her long after her divorce and prevented 
her from comprehending the injury she has suffered.175 
3. Expiration of a Suit Due to Sexual Abuse of Minors in the 
Framework of the Family 
The statute of limitations is routinely used as a defense even in relation 
to rape and sexual assault claims by vulnerable minors who suffered abuse 
at the hands of family members.  Minors who were sexually assaulted by 
family members, and who subsequently had the courage to sue their abusers, 
are mostly aided by Article 18 of the Statute of Limitations Law, 1958,176 
which contemplates that the statute of limitations would not begin to run 
 
 170. The process of recognizing an injustice that warrants compensation is not unique to 
these women.  In this sense, the intention is to track the civil creation of the legal dispute and 
its pre-legal sociological source.  See William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel, & Austin Sarat, 
The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming…, 15 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 631 (1980–81). 
 171. CC (TA) 82377/99 Melzer v. Schreiber (March 7, 2010), Nevo Legal Database (by 
subscription) (Isr.).   
 172. Id., ¶¶ 23, 30.2. 
 173. Id., ¶ 23. 
 174. Id., ¶ 25. 
 175. Id., ¶ 30.  Incidentally, the court decided that D’s prolonged depression was also a 
legitimate ground to suspend the period of limitation, pursuant to Article 11 of the Statute of 
Limitations Act, which provides that the period of limitation can be suspended where there is 
evidence of mental impairment.  Id., ¶¶ 30-30.3. 
 176. 5718-1958, SH No. 251 p. 112 (Isr.), at 112.  This was prior to the enactment of Article 
2 to Statute of Limitations Act (Amendment No. 4), 5767-2007, SH No. 2103 p. 385 (Isr.). 
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until their 18th birthday.177  This ensures that their right to file a suit expires 
only on their 25th birthday.  Even this relatively considerate rule turned out 
to be draconian in incest cases and has obstructed its victims’ access to 
realizing their rights in the civil courts.  Numerous studies in this area have 
demonstrated the ubiquitous difficulties facing women that suffered sexual 
abuse when they were minors.178  Such difficulties are amplified among 
those who suffered abuse from family members.  In most cases, victims of 
sexual offenses reveal their story only after many years, as a consequence of 
the fear, shame, and guilt they experience in anticipation of the fact of their 
abuse becoming public.  They find it difficult to mobilize the psychological 
resources necessary to file a claim, which would also involve confronting 
their terrifying attacker, and reliving their history of emotional and physical 
abuse. 
This phenomenon of avoiding disclosure of the sexual attack is a classic 
feminine life experience and not frequently encountered in tort law. 
Therefore, the Statute of Limitations offers no solution to it.  In most cases, 
victims of sexual abuse suffer severe psychological difficulties incepted at 
their first experience of abuse and continue to plague them throughout their 
lives.179  These difficulties have far-reaching implications in all areas of the 
victims’ lives and, as stated above, often deter women from claiming 
compensation for many years—if they are able to acquire the necessary 
psychological strength at all.180  Many victims of childhood abuse exhibit 
“disassociation”—the repression and corollary denial of the abuse—which 
enables them as victims to function in daily life.181  As a consequence of 
disassociation, many minors who were sexually assaulted as children only 
realize a causal link between the abuse they experienced and the damage it 
has caused years after the traumatic event(s) occurred, if they are able to at 
all.182  Usually, this realization materializes only subsequent to intense and 
prolonged psychological therapy.183  This phenomenon of disassociation is 
 
 177. Statute of Limitations Act, 5718-1958, SH No. 251 p.112 (Isr.), article 01. 
 178. See, e.g., Jody Messler Davies, Dissociation, Therapeutic Enactment, and 
Transference—Countertransference Processes: A Discussion of Papers on Childhood Sexual 
Abuse by S. Grand and J. Sarnat, 2 GENDER & PSYCHOANALYSIS 241 (1997). 
 179. For detailed delayed and harmful effects of incest see Judith Herman, Diana Russel & 
Karen Trocki, Long-Term Effects of Incestuous Abuse in Childhood 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 
1293, 1295 (1986). 
 180. Alan Rosenfeld, Statute of Limitations Barrier in Childhood Sexual Abuse Cases: The 
Equitable Estoppel Remedy, 12 HARV. WOMEN’S L. J. 206, 208–10 (1989).  
 181. Id. at 210, 212. 
 182. Margaret M. Cornish, Tort Law—Applying the Discovery Rule to Toll the Statute of 
Limitations in Incest Cases, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 323, 325–27 (1994) (identifying two types 
of incest survivors’ claims against statutes of limitations: the first one includes people who 
repressesed their memories of the sexual abuse to an extent that they were unable to relate it 
to their suffered harms, the second one includes people who repressed all of the abusive 
memories astogether). 
 183. For groundbreaking readings, see JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY: 
THE AFTERMATH OF VIOLENCE—FROM DOMESTIC ABUSE TO POLITICAL TERROR (1992). 
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of significant relevance to cases dealing with sexual assault victims.184  
However, courts have yet to decide on the impact dissociative responses 
should have on temporal limitations for a sexual assault claim.  Indeed, this 
important and decisive question has been left for “further discussion” by the 
Supreme Court.185   
Only after maintaining persistent and bitter feminist struggle was 
Amendment 4 to the Law on the Statute of Limitations passed in 2007.  This 
amendment states in Articles 18a and 18b that in cases of sexual assault 
committed against a minor by a close family relative, the limitation period 
of seven years commences on the plaintiff’s 28th birthday.186  Though the 
amendment represents a great step in the right direction in establishing better 
accessibility to tort recourse for victims who were minors at the time of 
sexual victimization, it is nevertheless doubtful that it adequately meets the 
unique needs of these victims.  Firstly, as the law is applied prospectively, 
claims which were outdated prior to the commencement of the amendment 
in July 2007 are still prohibited from being heard.187 Secondly, due to the 
numerous emotional, mental and psychological difficulties described above, 
some victims are unable to file their claims and thereby may be prevented 
from accessing the justice system. Thirdly, the amended provision applies 
only to cases where the perpetrator was a “close family member;” namely a 
parent, uncle or sibling.188  This narrow definition exempts other family 
members such as an uncle’s brother or a cousin.  These non-enumerated 
family members still have enormous effect on a victim’s sense of fear, shame 
and wish to protest the familial whole.  The same is true for influential non-
family member adults, such as a family friend, supporter, or close neighbor.  
D. INCENTIVIZING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FEMINIST CIVIL SOCIETY 
ORGANIZATIONS AND PRIVATE LAWYERS  
Tort law appeals greatly to practitioners due to its potential to yield a 
substantial stipend for the representing lawyer through the contingent fees 
mechanism.189  Inherent in tort proceedings is the possibility of the transfer 
 
 184. Rosenfeld, supra note 180, at 210. 
 185. HCJ 6008/93 State of Israel v. John Doe 48(5) PD 845 [1995] (Isr.); CC (TA) 1027/05 
State of Israel v. John Doe (May 6, 2009), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.); 
according to HCJ 6643/05 State of Israel v. John Doe (July 3, 2007), Nevo Legal Database 
(by subscription) (Isr.), ¶ 18 of Justice Arbel’s judgment; HCJ 8098/04 Jane Doe v. John Doe 
59(3) PD 111 [2004] (Isr.), the judgment of Justice Rubinstein.  In cases where a plaintiff 
proved that she suppressed sexually violent incidents to the point that she could not remember 
them and therefore was unable to relate them to her injuries, the question of whether the 
grounds for the suit were born on the day when her memories were awakened and should 
therefore be the date on which the limitation period began, should be left for “future 
consideration.”  HCJ 8098/04 Jane Doe v. John Doe 59(3) PD 111, 120 [2004] (Isr.).  
 186. Statute of Limitations Act (Amendment No. 4), 5767-2007, SH No. 2103 p. 385 (Isr.). 
 187. The law was given effectiveness prospectively, starting July 10, 2007.  See id. 
 188. Id., article 18A(b). 
 189. See, generally, Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingency Lawyers as Gatekeepers in the Civil 
Justice System, 81 JUDICATURE 22 (1997–98). 
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of a significant amount of money to the plaintiff, which strongly incentivizes 
lawyers to practice in this area of private law.190  This benefit of tort law may 
also serve to encourage the development of civil society organizations to be 
based upon a unique budget model whereby the organizations finance their 
social change activities using a proportion of the funds awarded to successful 
plaintiffs.  This unique characteristic of tort law, combined with feminist 
analysis of the law, enables this practical change to develop significantly.  
However, such a vision can be realized only in concurrence with the courts’ 
responsiveness to such a mindset.  
The organization The Center for Women’s Justice (Center) is an 
excellent example of one such feminist strategic move.  The Center, whose 
operations are driven by an explicit feminist social consciousness, sought to 
challenge the disadvantage Jewish women experience in divorce 
proceedings, and utilized tort law to file compensation claims against men 
refusing to grant their wives a divorce.191  These cases, which resulted in 
verdicts in favor of the female plaintiffs, were an impressive deterrent to 
other men seeking to obstruct their divorce proceedings.192  Another 
excellent example of this development is the Human Rights and Women’s 
Clinic, located at a private college, where the first successful tort claims were 
filed on behalf of women who were victims of sex trafficking.193  Tmura 
Center is another notable NGO, established entirely on the underlying 
premises of intense feminist tort litigation.194  This nonprofit organization 
works to fight discrimination and promote equality in Israel using tort law 
claims to hold public and private institutions, as well as individuals, 
accountable for injustices perpetrated under their auspices.195  The litigation 
 
 190. This is as opposed to any other field of law where pecuniary relief is not the primary 
(and to a realistic extent, the only) remedy. 
 191. Susan Weiss, the organization’s chairwoman, has provided academic insights into her 
work.  Susan M. Weiss, Israeli Divorce Law: The Maldistribution of Power, its Abuse, and 
the “Status” of Jewish Women, in MEN AND WOMEN: GENDER, JUDAISM, AND DEMOCRACY 53 
(Rachel Elior ed., 2004).  
 192. From an interview conducted with the Chairwoman of the Center, Attorney Susan 
Weiss, it seems that in all the judgments where a ruling was given in favor of the plaintiff, the 
reluctant husbands offered to grant their wives a divorce.  See Suing for Freedom: Women 
Denied Divorce Resort to Tort Claims, Haaretz Magazine (Apr. 19, 2011), http://www. 
haaretz.co.il/misc/1.1171601 (Hebrew). The fact that this was made possible in return for 
relinquishing at least part of the right for tort compensation raises a new difficulty that 
reproduces an element of blackmail that a woman seeking a divorce must face.  Rabbinical 
courts have started conditioning treating a woman’s plea for divorce upon her withdrawal of 
her tort suit.  See the details of such occurrence in the Supreme Religious Courts, as described 
by Justice Fogelman in HCG 568/13 Mavoi Satum v. Supreme Rabbinial Court (June 20, 
2013) (unpublished) (Isr.), ¶ 1. 
 193. For the important verdict where Justice Levhar-Sharon exhibits feminist awareness see 
HCJ 10506/06 Jane Doe v. Mizrahi (Mar. 24, 2008), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) 
(Isr.).   
 194. The author of this article is one of this NGO’s founders, and supervises its legal work 
on a voluntary basis. 
 195. Information regarding the center’s mission and activities can be found at TMURU 
CENTER, www.tmura.org.il (last visited Mar. 12, 2014). 
YIFAT (DO NOT DELETE) 4/3/2014  5:11 PM 
Summer 2014] FEMINIST APPROACHES TO TORT LAW 259 
puts a price tag on discrimination, which in turn acts as a significant deterrent 
against potential discriminators and policy-making authorities.  The center 
uses tort claims to raise awareness regarding socially transparent feminine 
suffering and render these harms compensable.  In one of Tmura Center’s 
recent cases, the court granted compensation to a woman whose maiden 
name was deleted from the population registry and changed automatically to 
that of her husband after she got married, which was done against her will 
and autonomy.196  This allegedly “private” case resulted in large-scale 
change for women, as the state amended its protocol, whereby women who 
married were now given a choice whether to change their maiden name upon 
marriage.197 
Simultaneous to this development in civil society, it is becoming 
apparent that many private lawyers with feminist inclinations have emerged.  
These individual attorneys began to represent women in cases of a similar 
nature to those enumerated above, either privately, or using the assistance 
that the state provides for low-income citizens.198  There also has been 
excellent cooperation between actors in the private, public, academic, and 
feminist tort markets which contributes in many different ways to expanding 
this important progressive development.199  In addition to its positive aspects, 
this process also shows the potential of translating the language of feminist 
analysis—often focused on theory and philosophy—into a reality of on-the-
ground social change.  Feminist criticism of tort law ensures actual 
application of its principles and instantaneous influence over its recipients.  
This also lends considerable importance to the analysis and to the importance 
of its continued development in this specific area. 
E. FUTURE CHALLENGES FEMINIST ANALYSIS FACES—BREAKWATER 
OF THE WAVES 
It seems that any summary of the impact of feminist analysis on tort law, 
however positive, warrants acknowledging its limitations.  In the Israeli case, 
two such caveats can be pinpointed; while one functions on the substantive 
level, the other operates on the symbolic-rhetorical level.  However, both of 
 
 196. CC 29770-08/11 (TA), Bitton v. The State of Israel (Oct. 18, 2012), Nevo Legal 
Database (by subscription) (Isr.). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Though no official data is available to prove this unfolding trend, the fact that the cases 
cited in this article are all from the last five years could serve as great indicator.   
 199. Tmura Center, for example, regularly participates in workshops for entrenching this 
new legal trend in private as well as public sector lawyers.  TMURU CENTER, www.tmura.org.il 
(last visited Mar. 12, 2014).  The Center also serves amicus pleas at the requests of private 
lawyers litigating feminist tort cases.  See, e.g., CC (TA) 1960/06 Jane Doe v. Ofer Glazer, 
(Nov. 30, 2011), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.) (presenting the prevalence of 
sexual harassment and its typical harms); HCJ 7565/09 Jane Doe v. John Doe [April 1, 2010], 
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.) (presenting the need for punitive damages in 
sexual assault cases).  
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these limitations are closely related and therefore require similar analytical 
approach. 
1. The Substantive Level 
As claimed and demonstrated above, the body of knowledge and 
development that feminist analysis has produced in tort law has begun to go 
a promising direction.  However, feminist analysis has yet to abolish advents 
of androcentric dynamics within tort law, which yield new arenas of 
discriminatory doctrines and limit women’s right to compensation through 
tort law.  To illustrate this point before closing the door behind the feminist 
struggle within tort law, it is prudent to briefly demonstrate the development 
of some antifeminist tortious trends and the subsequent need they create for 
persistent feminist analysis. 
For some time now, courts have demonstrated a clear tendency of failing 
to recognize various instances of sexual abuse as justifying the imposition of 
punitive damages on primary tortfeasors.200  Recently, the issue reached the 
Supreme Court, which confirmed this inclination and reinforced it as 
precedent.201  The regressive judgment was given on appeal, after two lower 
courts refused to accept a young girl’s request to impose punitive damages 
on a man who perpetrated a series of indecent sexual acts on her when she 
was only six years old.202  The girl invoked a battery claim, based on the 
factual foundation which was proven in the criminal proceedings, wherein 
the defendant was found guilty.203  However, though the defendant’s tort 
liability for battery was recognized, the plaintiff’s plea for punitive damages 
was denied.204  Subsequently, her appeals to the District and the Supreme 
Court were denied as well.  An appeal for special Further Discussion of this 
novel decision by an extended bench was likewise rejected.205 
The court’s holding that punitive damages are inapt in cases that 
underwent criminal proceedings raises counter feminist concerns in like 
 
 200. See, e.g., CC (TA) 1960/06 Jane Doe v. Ofer Glazer, (Nov. 30, 2011), Nevo Legal 
Database (by subscription) (Isr.) (accepting a sexual attack claim of a nurse against her private 
employer); CC 854/07 (Hi) Jane Does v. John Doe (Aug. 4, 2009), Nevo Legal Database (by 
subscription) (Isr.) (accepting rape claims of minors against their mother’s spouses); CC 
2039/07 (TA) Jane Doe v. John Doe (Dec. 27, 2009), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) 
(Isr.) (accepting a rape claim of a woman against her “spiritual” coach). 
 201. HCJ 9670/07 Jane Doe v. John Doe (July 6, 2009), Nevo Legal Database (by 
subscription) (Isr.). 
 202. Id., ¶ b. 
 203. CC (TA) 1112/00 State of Israel v. John Doe (2000) (unpublished) (Isr.).  The 
defendant was sentenced to two years in prison, with two years on parole and was required to 
pay a minor fine of 5,000 IS.  These facts are described by the Supreme Court in its decision 
in the civil suit in HCJ 9670/07 Jane Doe v. John Doe (July 6, 2009), ¶ b. 
 204. HCJ 9670/07 Jane Doe v. John Doe, ¶¶ 22-27. 
 205. The request for further hearing based on the important implications of the decision was 
rejected by then-Chief Justice Beinisch.  Id.  The Center for Legal Clinics, the Center for the 
Protection of Children Victims of Sexual Violence Rights, the Center for Children and Family 
Rights, the Israeli Bar Association, the Women Crisis Center, and the Tmura 
Antidiscrimination Center all joined the case as amici.  
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cases for various reasons.206  From a conceptual perspective, this dismissal 
ignores the important function of deterrence in tort law in general, and 
punitive damages in particular, thereby reducing tort law’s ability to deter 
potential perpetrators of sexual assaults.207  This is particularly true given 
that extensive research reveals that the average compensation awarded to 
women in similar criminal proceedings—and indeed were also awarded to 
the plaintiff in this particular case—is as low as only 5,000 NIS.208  This 
amount appears to function more as a symbolic and repetitive gesture rather 
than an award that takes into account each injury’s individual implications.  
Furthermore, while all malicious actions require deterrence, in cases of 
violence and sexual assault, deterrence is especially vital.209  These behaviors 
are not socially unacceptable in the same manner that the court considers, for 
instance, medical malpractice to be unacceptable, for which it awards 
compensation.210  The distinction is that these are behaviors which are mala 
per se and dangerous to our social existence.  Moreover, in keeping with this 
conceptual approach, the fact that punitive damages were traditionally 
awarded to victims of criminal assaults and are still imposed in cases of non-
sexual batteries, makes it particularly difficult to understand the Court's 
decision, as acts of sexual assault easily fit within the definition of criminal 
physical assault.211  The practical effect of denying punitive compensation is 
especially severe for women, since it denies them a significant component 
of compensation, and therefore makes their claims less attractive to them and 
to lawyers representing them.212  The Court’s decision also terminated an 
important progressive move that had begun to take shape, which distinctly 
recognized punitive damages as a central component of compensation for 
sexual assault.213 
 
 206. The Court did not entirely rule out punitive damages in cases where a punishment was 
imposed on the defendant in criminal proceedings, as the then-Chief Justice Beinisch put it, 
but rather maintained that, in these cases, such damages should be deemed “most exceptional 
of the exceptional cases.”  Id., ¶ 8.  
 207. Deterrence is one of tort law’s primary goals.  See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF 
ACCIDENTS 24–30 (1970); Daniel W. Shuman, Psychology of Deterrence in Tort Law, 42 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 115, 118–132 (1993); Israel Gilead, The Boundaries of Efficient Deterrence in 
Tort Law, 22 MISHPATIM 421 (1993–94) (Hebrew).  
 208. See CC (TA) 1112/00 The State of Israel v. John Doe (2000) (unpublished) (Isr.).  
 209. The importance of retribution cannot be underestimated in such cases.  See Keren-Paz, 
supra note 87. 
 210. Social blameworthiness rather than moral blameworthiness underlies negligence 
liability.  The first one to isolated negligence as the comprehensive embodiment of the 
principle of fault liability in tort law was Holmes.  See OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON 
LAW (1881). 
 211. Punitive damages in Israeli tort law were incepted and repeatedly recognized within 
assault and battery case law.  See, e.g., HCJ 216/54 Sneider v. Glik, 9 PD 1331 [1955] (Isr.); 
HCJ 30/72 Friedman v. Segal, 27(2) PD 225 [1973] (Isr.); CC (Jer) 7793/05 Kazin v. Avitan 
(Aug. 6, 2006), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.). 
 212. FLETCHER, supra note 126, at 58–65. 
 213. See, e.g., CC (TA) 2191/02 Jane Doe v. John Doe (Mar. 8, 2006) Nevo Legal Database 
(by subscription) (Isr.).  In another case of a gang rape, the punitive damages of 1,325,000 
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Feminist analysis can also point to the denial of this form of 
compensation as a mistaken understanding of the basic principles of tort law.  
Indeed, it is possible to contend that courts’ refusal to award punitive 
damages to women in these cases is equivalent, in practice, to determining—
contrary to the perception of tort law in common law and in Israel in 
particular214—that tort law does not have the power to grant punitive 
damages.  This conclusion arises from the simple reasoning that it is difficult 
to imagine another area that is more difficult than, or fundamentally different 
from, sexual assaults on the body that would warrant a deviation from this 
developing practice.  Therefore, it seems that, de facto, such custom will 
render void this type of compensation.  Especially outrageous in this context 
was the Court’s reasoning that, in cases where the offender has been 
criminally prosecuted and punished, there is no reason to punish him 
again.215  Aside from the disregard for the independent function of punitive 
damages in tort law and the confusing relationship it evokes with criminal 
law, the restriction on punitive damages is fortuitous for the most formidable 
transgressors; the case against these defendants is clear and therefore the 
process of imposing criminal liability on them for their actions is relatively 
simple.  The women who are injured by these offenders—and who are likely 
to suffer most from their acts due to their especially heinous nature—will 
remain with a limited compensation scheme for redress, where until recently, 
tort law afforded their harms special treatment.  
This matter highlights the inherent tension between the legislative 
purpose underlying awarding punitive damages in civil proceedings, which 
seeks to recognize certain behaviors as reprehensible,216 and the risk of 
 
NIS served as the major component of the compensation for the victim.  See CC (Hi) 209/05 
Jane Doe v. Mizrahi (May 1, 2008), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.). 
 214. The principled authority of Israeli courts to grant punitive damages was recently 
restated by the Supreme Court in HCJ 9656/03 Etinger Estate v. The Restoration Venture of 
the Jewish Quarter in Jerusalem 58(4) PD 486 [2004] (Isr.).  This practice is long known to 
prevail in common law systems, to different degrees.  For America, see FLETCHER, supra note 
126, at 58–66.  For Australia, for instance, see FRANCIS A. TRINDADE & PETER CANE, THE 
LAW OF TORTS IN AUSTRALIA 530 (3d ed. 2001).  
 215. See HCJ 9670/07 Jane Doe v. John Doe (July 6, 2009), Nevo Legal Database (by 
subscription) (Isr.).  Justice Rubinstein stipulated: 
I think that if as a rule, punitive damages are only awarded in exceptional cases, 
if there is a punishment given in a criminal proceeding, it will only be in cases 
of the exception to the exception (so exceptional that it is hard to even give an 
example, and it may be that we are referring to such cases where for some reason 
it was not possible to impose criminal punishment).  The reason for this is clear.  
The rationale for the award of punitive damages is ‘punitive and deterrent’ . . . 
they are ‘designed to reflect society’s disgust with the criminal’s behavior.’ . . .  
In general, when criminal proceedings are carried out, these objectives are 
achieved in the criminal process—this is their natural place and they have no real 
place in civil procedure. 
Id., ¶ 23.  
 216. See, e.g., HCJ 140/00 The Estate of Etinger v. The Jewish Quarter Development 
Company 58(4) PD 566 [2004] (Isr.); HCJ 9656/03 The Estate of Marziano v. Zinger (April 
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double punishment which would occur if criminal proceedings have already 
taken place and the defendant has been convicted.  Indeed, there is 
undoubtedly a connection between compensation granted in criminal 
proceedings and civil proceedings, which adjudicate the same matter.  
Nonetheless, there are some fundamental substantive distinctions between 
the two.  It is significant that the defendant sits at the center of criminal 
proceedings, while the victim sits at the center of civil proceeding, asking 
for recognition of the injuries she has incurred.217  Furthermore, assuming 
that double punishment does occur, in these instances it should be considered 
just; punitive damages are designed to express indignation over abhorrent 
behavior, as well as deterring potential offenders and ensuring an educational 
effect, which may prevent the recurrence of the act.218 
Moreover, even if the court had ruled that punitive damages were 
unjustified, it would have been prudent for it to provide a pragmatic 
alternative in the form of aggravated damages.  This form of compensation 
is fundamentally different from punitive damages, since it is intended to 
express the severity of the harmful behavior and therefore falls within the 
boundaries of compensatory damages instead.  When the court awards 
aggravated damages, it must take into account the severity of the offender's 
behavior, which impacts the level of the injuries incurred by the plaintiff, 
and can subsequently lead to an increase in the amount of compensation to 
which the plaintiff is entitled.219  Such was the case with L v. L220 where a 
minor, assisted by her mother, initiated proceedings against her father who 
had sodomized and raped her.  One of the heads of damages requested by the 
plaintiff was aggravated damages and\or punitive damages.  Though the 
court stated that it could not award the plaintiff punitive damages, it 
subsequently awarded her aggravated damages which reflected the severity 
of the injuries that she incurred.221  In this way the court neutralized the fear 
 
11, 2005), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.); HCJ 8382/04 The Hadassah Medical 
Foundation v. Mizrahi (Feb. 2, 2006), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.). 
 217. “Though within Civil Procedure the court considers imposing ‘punitive’ damages, and 
within criminal procedure the court considers imposing damages, ostensibly ’civilian,’ one 
should not mix the two processes.”  CC (Hi) 19415/02 Dina v. Doron 17 (Jan. 30, 2005), Nevo 
Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.). 
 218. This understanding is acknowledged in Israel as well as in the United States.  See Ronen 
Perry & Yehuda Adar, Wrongful Abortion: A Wrong in Search of a Remedy, 5 YALE J. HEALTH 
POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 507 (2005); TEDESCHI, supra note 151.  For American law see FLETCHER, 
supra note 126, at 58–65. 
 219. See HCJ 802/87 Nof v. Avneri, 45(2) PD 489, 494 [1991] (Isr.); HCJ 30/72 Friedman 
v. Segal, 27(2) PD 225 [1973] (Isr.); DAPHNE BARAK-EREZ, CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS: THE 
PECUNIARY PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 276–77 (1993); Bitton, Dignity 
Aches, supra note 30, at 171–77.  
 220. CC (Jer) 2160/99 L. v. L. (Aug. 31, 2005), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) 
(Isr.).  
 221. Id. at 235.  The aggravated damages that were awarded to the minor were 300,000 IS 
which shows the importance the court attributed to this head of damage.  A bad example of 
the use of this tool was the award of 5,000 IS in the case of Jane Doe for nonmonetary 
damages.  See CC (TA) 1112/00 State of Israel v. John Doe (2000) (unpublished) (Isr.).  
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that punitive damages would serve as double punishment, while at the same 
time compensated the victim with a significant sum, additional to traditional 
damages calculus.  
2. The Symbolic-Rhetorical Level 
After carefully reading the abovementioned progressive tort decisions in 
Israeli law it is clear that in most of them the court deliberately refrained 
from applying explicit feminist analysis in its rulings.222  In some cases, this 
disregard has had little effect on the results of a case, if at all.  This is because 
from a substantive perspective, the court complied with the feminist 
perspective and reached an appropriate result.  Nevertheless, satisfaction 
with the result, without the accompaniment of feminist insight as to what 
constitutes worthy tort conduct within the framework of power relations, 
may lead to a limited understanding of these cases’ tortious legacy.223  Aside 
from this, the systematic abstention of the court from recognizing feminist 
analysis of tort law does not provide this rich and important analysis its 
rightful place, and allows for its marginalization within the conceptual 
debate.224  For these reasons, the unique and enriching contribution of 
feminist analysis through open recognition of its importance to legal 
reasoning by the courts must be more apparent and encouraged.225   
 
Similar discontent with this amount was expressed by Justice Rivlin in his concurrence, where 
he proposed increasing the amount of compensation to 300,000 IS. 
 222. One of the few times where the Supreme Court addressed feminist scholarship was in 
the case of HCJ 10064/02 Migdal Insurance Company v. Abu-Hanna 60(3) PD 13 [2005] 
(Isr.).  There, Justice Rivlin referred to the writing of Martha Chamallas as a possible theory 
for analyzing the case at hand.  However, eventually, he decided to refrain from applying 
feminist analysis to resolves the case, and stated that utilizing it in the future should be left to 
“further consideration.”  Id. at 46. 
 223. Using a feminist approach in cases, which warrant feminist analysis, is harmful to tort 
law itself.  See, for example, the problem of ignoring power relations between spouses in the 
case of refusal to grant a divorce by women to their husbands, as discussed in supra note 123. 
 224. See, e.g., Benjamin Shmueli, Tort Compensation for Those Being Refused a Divorce, 
12 HAMISHPAT 285 (2007) (Hebrew).  In his article, Shmueli justifies imposing liability on 
men who refuse to grant divorce without resorting to feminist approach.  Id. at 288–89.  This 
position, as stated, ignores the inherent limitations of such analysis.  The paper was received 
with enthusiasm by the courts, which often cite it.  See, e.g., CC (TA) 24782/98 N.S. v. N.Y. 
(Feb. 14, 2008), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.); CC (Jer) 6743/02 K. v. K. (July 
21, 2005), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.). 
 225. A step in the right direction was a statement in a recent decision handed out by the 
Supreme Court, supporting relatively high and unprecedented amount of money as 
compensation for a woman plaintiff injured at the hands of her abusive former husband: 
“[C]ourts, especially those dealing with domestic issues, should pay particular attention to my 
statement.  The phenomena of domestic violence has been identified time and again as a harm 
to be abolished . . . but there is no reason in the world why Torts, too, not participate in this 
(legal) effort. . . .  The courts are authorized to use compensatory mechanisms also as a tool 
in the comprehensive battle against violence.”  Justice Rubinstein, who wrote this statement, 
thereafter refers to a few resources, among them, feminist writing on the topic.  HCJ 7073/13 
John Doe v. Jane Doe (Dec. 31, 2013), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.), ¶ 8. 
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F. SUMMARY—FEMINIZATION OF TORT LAW—TOWARDS A BETTER 
UNDERSTANDING 
From providing an overview of the contribution of feminist analysis to 
tort law, and reviewing the various stages the feminist analysis has 
undergone, a central phenomenon is revealed; during the second wave of 
feminist analysis, this approach’s virtue was not set in its value as an 
outsider, feminist critique.  It further became a tool for facilitating a better 
and deeper understanding of tort law more generally, from an internal point 
of view.  Judgments that addressed feminine life experiences reshaped the 
account of tort liability’s most distinctive elements, rendering second wave 
feminist critique of tort law transformative in nature.226  
A comparative feminist analysis of gender inclinations of tort law in 
different countries allows us to understand the way in which legal systems 
achieve a balance of interests under this field of law, using various 
approaches.227  Comparative resources can attest to the importance of the 
continued development of feminist analysis in equality-striving legal 
systems, as a source of benefit to women as well as to other socially 
disadvantaged groups and to feminism’s role in deepening contemporary 





 226. See the text of this article, accompanying supra notes 56, 80, 82, 85, 106. 
 227. Bitton, Liability of Bias, supra note 3. 
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